The effect of horizontal mergers, when firms compete in prices and investments by Motta, Massimo & Tarantino, Emanuele
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Mannheim / Department of Economics 
 
Working Paper Series 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effect of Horizontal Mergers,  
When Firms Compete in Prices and Investments 
 
 
Massimo Motta     Emanuele Tarantino 
 
 
Working Paper 17-01 
 
 
September 2017 
 
The Effect of Horizontal Mergers, When Firms Compete
in Prices and Investments∗
Massimo Motta
ICREA-Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE
Emanuele Tarantino
University of Mannheim and MaCCI
30 August 2017
Abstract
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to
invest and hence are pro-competitive. To study the effects of mergers, we rewrite a game
with simultaneous price and cost-reducing investment choices as one where firms only
choose prices, and make use of aggregative game theory. We find no support for that
claim: absent efficiency gains, the merger lowers total investments and consumer surplus.
Only if it entails sufficient efficiency gains, will it be pro-competitive. We also show there
exist classes of models for which the results obtained with cost-reducing investments are
equivalent to those with quality-enhancing investments.
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1 Introduction
In a series of recent high-profile mergers in the mobile telephony industry in the EU,1 the telecom
industry has urged the European Commission (which had jurisdiction on these mergers) to take
into account that the mergers would have led to higher investments. Mobile Network Operators
(MNOs) have made two main arguments in support of this claim. The first is related to existence
of scale economies of various nature, and as such it is not conceptually controversial (but it
would need to be empirically verified).2 The second argues that a merger favors investments
because industry consolidation would give firms stronger incentives to invest. This argument
in particular has resonated with politicians and heads of government, and has been widely
discussed in the press.3 Whether mergers encourage or not investment and innovation is an
issue which goes well beyond the telecom industry. Antitrust agencies all over the world,
for instance, recognize the importance of assessing the dynamic effects of a merger and the
possibility that it may reduce innovation and product variety.4
To our knowledge, and quite surprisingly, there exists very little work that studies the-
oretically the competitive effects of mergers in a context where firms can not only compete
in the product market but also on investments. Of course, there exists a wide literature on
the related issue of the effects of competition in general on investments and on innovations.5
However, this literature analyzes what happens to investments when some proxy variable for
competition intensifies or relaxes symmetrically for all firms, whereas we explicitly study the
effect of a merger, which is an inherently asymmetric change: two firms combine their assets
whereas the competitive environment (for instance the toughness of competition or the extent
of product differentiation) is otherwise the same. Apart from better reflecting the nature of
a merger, our model also allows to uncover the different effects that a merger has on insiders
and outsiders, as well as its overall competitive impact (what is the effect on consumers?), a
question which is less relevant in a literature which focuses on how investment and R&D effort
react to a symmetric shock to competition (consumers typically benefit/suffer as competition
intensifies/softens).
1See the European Commission decisions on the Hutchison/Orange (Austria), Hutchison/Telefonica Ireland,
Telefonica Deutschland/EPlus, TeliaSonera/Telenor, Hutchison 3G/Telefonica UK, and H3G Italy/Wind cases.
2Like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice in the United States, the European
Commission requires efficiencies to be verifiable, merger-specific, and beneficial to consumers, the three being
cumulative conditions. This implies that efficiency claims need to be fully documented, that synergies that could
be achieved through less anticompetitive means (e.g., via internal growth or via a Network-Sharing Agreement)
would not be recognized, and that savings on fixed costs would not be accepted as they would not lead to lower
prices.
3See for instance Daniel Thomas and Alex Barker, “Telecoms: Europeans scrambled signal”, Financial Times,
30 June 2014; “Together we stand”, The Economist, 22 August 2015; “Britain must not go from four to three
in mobile”, Financial Times, 2 February 2016. See also the discussion in Faccio and Zingales (2017).
4See the “Horizontal Merger Guidelines” by the U.S. Department of Justice and FTC, August 2010. In
the recent DowChemical/DuPont case, for instance, the European Commission found that the merger would
have significantly reduced the incentives to invest in R&D in the pesticide market, and hence imposed a major
divestiture by DuPont as a condition for clearance. See European Commission Press Release of 27 March 2017
at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-772_en.htm.
5Vives (2008) reviews this literature and studies a range of models to identify these effects. For more recent
contributions in this line of research, see also Schmutzler (2013), Lopez and Vives (2016), and Marshall and
Parra (2016).
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In this paper, we study the competitive impact of mergers in a setting where firms set both
investment levels and prices, and where at the benchmark - that is, absent the merger - firms
sell one differentiated product, whereas the merger will create a new multi-product firm which
owns two product varieties, thereby breaking the symmetry in the industry.
As we shall see, our analysis strongly suggests that - under no or weak enough efficiency
savings - a merger will reduce aggregate investments and harm consumers. Interestingly, this
net effect will be the result of the decrease in investment and rise in prices on the side of the
merging parties (the “insiders”), and the increase in investments, with prices which may either
increase or decrease on the side of the “outsiders” to the merger.
We find that it is only when merger-driven cost savings in investments are sufficiently strong
that the merger will be pro-competitive, which confirms - in a setting where firms compete not
only in the product market but also in investments - the well-known result that a merger harms
consumers unless there are sufficiently strong efficiency gains.6
Let us now be more specific about what we do in the paper. We analyze a game where firms
choose cost-reducing investments and prices simultaneously. This allows us to abstract from
strategic considerations inherent to sequential games and it is equivalent to an environment
in which investment decisions are unobservable. Within a general model - for weak or no
efficiency gains - the merger will always result in the insiders raising their prices and reducing
their investments. This is ultimately due to the well-known market power effect of the merger:
the merged entity internalizes that a price decrease in one of its products will reduce the
demand of the other product it sells, and this determines an upward pressure in prices relative
to the benchmark where all firms are independent. In turn, higher prices will lead to a lower
quantity sold by the insiders, and a lower marginal revenue from investing for the insiders,
whose investments will therefore decrease.
In the standard models of mergers with price-setting firms and where investments are not
considered, outsiders’ prices also increase due to strategic complementarity. But this is not
always the case in our model. The merger does not directly affect the outsiders’ first-order
conditions, and when the insiders increase their prices, this will tend to increase outsiders’
prices as well. But since outsiders’ prices increase less, their demand tends to increase (their
market share will rise for sure), and this will increase their (cost-reducing) investment levels.
Two different effects are therefore at work: one which tends to increase their prices, and the
other, through lower costs, which tends to decrease them. At equilibrium, outsiders’ prices may
either increase or decrease, and indeed we shall show that either outcome may arise according
to the demand assumptions made.
Since the merger may have different effects on insiders’ and outsiders’ prices and investments,
and since firms are selling differentiated products, it is not a priori clear what are the net effects
of the merger. To answer this question, we first transform our original game - in which each firm
chooses two variables (prices and investments) - into one in which each firm chooses only one
variable. Next, we resort to an aggregative game theory formulation, which is possible whenever
the payoff of a player depends on its own action and an additively separable aggregate of all
players’ actions (Selten, 1970).7
6See Farrell and Shapiro (1990), who offer a general treatment in a homogenous goods model; or Motta
(2004: chapter 5) for a textbook presentation (based on a differentiated goods model with price competition).
7We use the oligopolistic aggregative game toolkit developed in Anderson et al. (2016) (see Anderson and
Peitz, 2015, for an application to two-sided markets). Nocke and Schutz (2016) develop the aggregative game
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This allows us to establish that - absent efficiency gains - the merger has a negative impact
on consumer surplus.8 This result holds for all classes of demand functions which satisfy the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, or IIA, property, like the CES and the logit demand
models. We show it also holds in standard parametric product differentiation models - such as
the Shubik-Levitan, and the Salop circle models - which do not satisfy the IIA property. We
also find a sufficient condition for which the merger decreases total investments. Finally, we
demonstrate that - as expected - the merger will be pro-competitive and investment-boosting
if it allows firms to benefit from strong enough efficiency gains in R&D.
We then extend our analysis in several directions. First, we consider the case where firms
offer asymmetric goods, and confirm that - absent efficiency gains - a merger between any two of
them will reduce consumer welfare. We also find sufficient conditions for the merger to reduce
aggregate investments.
Second, we study the effects of a merger when firms undertake quality-enhancing invest-
ments. Within a general model, the results are a priori ambiguous: on the one hand, by
raising prices the merger will increase the marginal profitability of investments; on the other,
the merged entity will internalize the fact that increasing the quality of one product will reduce
attractiveness (and profits) of its other product, and this reduces its incentive to invest. How-
ever, we prove that there exist two broad classes of models with quality-enhancing investments
which turn out to be equivalent to the models with cost-reducing investments we have discussed
above. For such classes of models, which include popular vertical product differentiation mod-
els, the same conclusions as above (namely, that the merger harms consumers) will therefore
apply.
Third, we consider the case where investments give rise to involuntary spillovers (in our base
model we assume instead that firms can fully appropriate their investments) and show that the
existence of such spillovers shares some similarity with efficiency gains: since the merger allows
firms to internalize them, higher spillovers lead to stronger incentives to invest by the merged
entity.
Fourth, we consider a sequential game (firms first invest, their choice is observed by all, and
then choose prices). The presence of strategic effects makes it difficult to establish propositions
of general validity about the effects of the merger (and an aggregative game theory formulation
for the sequential game is not possible). Nonetheless, the analysis of parametric models confirms
the qualitative results found for the simultaneous moves case: the merger harms consumers;
it increases prices and decreases investments of the insiders; it increases investments of the
outsiders; and it may either decrease or increase outsiders’ prices.
Finally, the reference to the mobile telephony industry raises the question whether it is pos-
sible to benefit from savings in the investment outlays without a full-fledged merger. Several
national regulatory authorities in the EU and elsewhere have often allowed MNOs to engage
approach to study oligopolistic competition with multi-product firms, but their assumption that there are no
fixed costs makes it difficult to apply their setting to our problem.
8We call a merger “anticompetitive” if it reduces consumer surplus. This is the standard adopted by the US
and European competition agencies when they screen mergers. Indeed, the US Horizontal Merger Guidelines
focus on the effect of a merger on customers and efficiency gains are accepted only to the extent that they will
lead to lower prices. Similarly, in assessing both agreements and mergers, the European Commission admits
only cost savings that are passed on to consumers. There is a debate as to whether agencies should instead
adopt a total welfare standard. See e.g. Neven and Ro¨ller (2005), Farrell and Shapiro (2006), and Pittman
(2007). For completeness we shall also indicate - when we are able to identify them - the effects of the merger on
total surplus. For instance, we shall show that in the Salop model total surplus may increase with the merger.
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in Network Sharing Agreements (NSAs), whereby they share different elements of the network
infrastructure and possibly of the spectrum9 while continuing to behave independently at the
retail level. We model NSAs as R&D cooperative agreements (see, e.g., d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin, 1988): firms participating in the agreement decide investments to maximize joint
profits, but they behave non-cooperatively when setting prices. The assumption that invest-
ments are taken cooperatively is consistent with the observation that, typically, the contract
signed between NSA parties specifies the volume of future investments that each party is to
undertake under the agreement. This practice also leaves limited room to free-riding. Moreover,
we assume that prices are set non-cooperatively, as otherwise the NSA would be equivalent to
a full-fledged merger.10 With simultaneous moves and efficiency gains, we show that the NSA
increases consumer welfare with respect to the benchmark.11 This means that the NSA raises
consumer welfare with respect to any merger that harms consumer surplus (i.e., those mergers
that come with small efficiency gains). Instead, both the NSA and the merger raise welfare
when efficiency gains are large.12
To summarize, by referring back to the arguments used by the mobile network operator
industry, the claim that mergers promote investment because consolidation creates higher in-
centives to invest appears unfounded in the light of our analysis. Only if there are sufficiently
large R&D efficiency gains from the merger, will it be beneficial. But of course whether the
‘if’ applies is an empirical fact that should be verified case by case, as already foreseen by the
current rules on merger control in major jurisdictions, like the US and the EU.
Let us now briefly mention the relationship between our paper and related branches of the
literature other than those mentioned above. A complementary perspective to our analysis
is offered by the literature studying dynamic oligopoly games.13 Specifically, Mermelstein et
al. (2015) study the impact of mergers on the evolution of an industry, and derive the optimal
dynamic merger policy in a model with capital accumulation and economies of scale. Differently
from our model, in their setting two firms bargain over a merger to monopolize the industry.
These firms invest to accumulate capital and exploit scale economies. Post-merger, an entrant
appears in the market with zero capital. (Apart from having a different aim, their assumptions
of homogenous goods and free entry clearly differentiate their environment from ours.) They
find that the antitrust authority should depart from the myopic policy suggested by Nocke and
Whinston (2010), and instead undertake a more restrictive policy.
As for the empirical literature on the effects of mergers on investments, it is also quite scant,
and does not offer clear insights on what are the likely effects of the merger.14 Of course, there
9There exist several types of NSAs, from passive NSAs where the firms just share the site (say, each firm has
its own equipment but they put it on the same mast), to active NSAs where active elements are shared, which
in their more extreme form also include sharing the spectrum.
10Our approach to modeling NSAs also implicitly assumes that NSA members have free access to the joint
infrastructure - or whatever is the outcome of the jointly decided investments.
11Of course, it is conceivable that for contractual or technological reasons the NSA may not allow partner
firms to achieve the scale economies that can be obtained when there is a full merger. But this is a factual and
case-specific claim that firms would have to substantiate in a merger investigation.
12When resorting to standard product differentiation models (like the Shubik-Levitan demand function, and
the Salop circle model) we also show that the NSA results in lower prices and higher consumer and total welfare
than the merger.
13See, among others, Ericson and Pakes (1995), Gowrisankaran (1999), Fershtman and Pakes (2000).
14Ornaghi (2009) finds that mergers in the pharmaceutical industry decreases innovation. Focarelli and
Panetta (2003) find that mergers in the Italian retail banking industry have raised prices in the short-run but
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is also a large empirical literature on how competition impacts upon innovations, investments
and productivity,15 but again a merger is not tantamount to a general shift in the competitive
pressure in a sector.
The paper continues thus. Section 2 studies the effects of the merger within a simultaneous
moves model with cost-reducing investments. In Section 3, we extend the analysis by considering
asymmetric firms, quality-enhancing investments, involuntary spillovers, a sequential moves
game, and a Network-Sharing Agreements (or Research Joint Venture). Section 4 concludes.
2 A model of price competition and cost-reducing in-
vestments
We use a model of Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated goods and n ≥ 2 firms. Demand for
the good produced by firm i is given by qi(pi, p¯−i), where pi, which is assumed to take values
in a compact interval,16 is the price of firm i and p¯−i is the (n− 1)× 1 vector of prices set by
firms −i 6= i. The number of independent firms, n, is exogenous, reflecting barriers to entry,
although it changes with the merger. Function qi(pi, p¯−i) is symmetric,17 strictly decreasing
and twice continuously differentiable whenever qi > 0. As is standard, we also assume that
demand of firm i decreases in pi (∂piqi(pi, p¯−i) < 0), goods are substitutes (∂pjqi(pi, p¯−i) ≥ 0),
and own price effects are larger than cross price effects (|∂piqi(pi, p¯−i)| > ∂pjqi(pi, p¯−i)) - where
∂pi and ∂
2
pipi
denote, respectively, the first- and the second-order partial derivative with respect
to pi, for all i = 1, ..., n.
Each firm i simultaneously sets its price pi and its cost-reducing investment xi to maximize
profits, given rivals’ choices. In the model, c(xi) denotes firm i’s marginal cost as function of
xi. We assume that c
′ < 0, c′′ ≥ 0, c′′′ ≥ 0 and c(0) = c ≥ 0. We denote by F (xi) the fixed cost
borne by firm i to invest xi, with F (0) = 0, F
′ ≥ 0, F ′′ ≥ 0 and F ′′′ ≥ 0.
A merger between two firms i and k may give rise to cost savings in R&D, which we will
refer to as efficiency gains. The parameter λ ∈ [0, 1) captures the importance of these efficiency
gains enjoyed by a merged entity, whose total cost is given by F (xi) + F (xk)− λG(xi, xk) ≥ 0,
with ∂xiG(xi, xk), ∂xkG(xi, xk) ≥ 0 and ∂xiG(x, x) = ∂xkG(x, x).18 As we shall see, the following
decreased them in the long-run due to enhanced efficiency. Genakos et al. (2015) estimate an empirical model
and use it to predict the impact of (hypothetical and symmetric) four-to-three mergers. They find that prices
would increase, per-firm capital expenditures (a proxy for investments) would also increase, but no evidence of
effects on total capital expenditures.
15See for instance the work by Aghion et al. (2005) which identifies an inverted-U shape relationship between
competition and innovation, and Shapiro (2013) for a critique of their analysis; and the surveys by Bartelsman
and Doms (2000) and Syverson (2011).
16Specifically, we bound prices by ruling out outcomes with negative payoffs.
17That is, the demand of firm i when it sets a price equal to p and all the other firms set a price equal to z
in vector z¯ is the same as the quantity of a firm j setting p given that all other firms set a price equal to z in
vector z¯ (i.e., qi(p, z¯) = qj(p, z¯)) for all i, j. If firms i and j merge, the condition for symmetry requires that
firm i’s quantity is the same as firm j’s when i and j set p and all other firms set z. In Section 3.1 we show our
main results still hold when the assumption of symmetry is relaxed.
18In previous versions of the paper we modeled efficiency gains as affecting marginal costs of production:
c(xi, xk, λ) = c(xi + Isλxk), with Is = 0 when firms are independent and Is = 1 if they are merged. The results
were qualitatively the same as those reported here. Note that in this section we assume that a firm is able to
fully appropriate its own investments (for instance because they are fully protected by IPRs or property rights
laws). In Section 3.3 we discuss the case of involuntary spillovers.
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conditions are necessary for the unicity of firms’ investment value at equilibrium:
F ′(xi)− λ∂xiG(xi, xk) ≥ 0, F ′′(xi)− λ∂xixiG(xi, xk) ≥ 0.
Roadmap of this section For the remaining part of this section, we proceed in the following
way. In Section 2.1 we write the firms’ maximization problem at the benchmark (i.e., if the
merger does not take place), show that the firms’ bi-dimensional (price and investment) variable
problem can be written as a one-dimension (price) problem (we resort to this transformation
throughout the paper), and that the benchmark equilibrium is unique for a general demand
function under standard regularity assumptions. We then write the maximization problem and
the FOCs in case of a merger, and explain why the characterization of the merger equilibrium
is not a straightforward problem. Since part of the complexity is due to the interaction between
insiders and outsiders to the merger, we start by abstracting from outsiders’ reactions: Section
2.2 fully characterizes the effect of a merger to monopoly under a general demand function
(to do so, we rely on the existence and uniqueness of the benchmark equilibrium previously
established). Section 2.3 is the main section of the paper. It focuses on classes of demand
functions such that a firm’s payoff only depends on its own action and the sum of the actions of
all the firms in the industry, which allows us to resort to an aggregative game theory formulation
of the problem and to establish the main effects of the merger, notably on consumer surplus
and on total investments. Finally, Section 2.4 analyzes specific functional form examples, both
to consider models which do not satisfy the sufficient conditions under which some results hold,
and to gain further insights on the effects of the merger, for instance on insiders’ and outsiders’
prices and investments, and on total surplus.
With the exception of Lemma 1, which describes the transformation of the “investment-
and-price” firm’s problem into a “only-price” problem, all the proofs are in the Appendix.
2.1 Equilibrium analysis
In what follows, we first analyze the benchmark (or status quo) case, where there are n inde-
pendent firms. Then, we study the effects of the merger, where two out of the n firms merge.
2.1.1 Benchmark with independent firms
In the benchmark, each firm i solves the following maximization problem:
max
pi,xi
p˜ii(pi, p¯−i, xi) = (pi − c(xi))qi(pi, p¯−i)− F (xi), i = 1, .., n.
The associated first-order conditions (FOCs) are:
∂pi p˜ii = qi(pi, p¯−i) + ∂piqi(pi, p¯−i)(pi − c(xi)) = 0, (1)
∂xi p˜ii = −c′(xi)qi(pi, p¯−i)− F ′(xi) = 0. (2)
In order to ensure that the FOCs give rise to a unique symmetric equilibrium, one may
follow two different approaches. The first one is to impose the regularity conditions on the
bi-dimensional problem that firms solve (each firm needs to maximize profits with respect to
both investments and prices). We may do this by invoking the assumptions in, e.g., Hefti
(forthcoming). The second approach is to reduce the bi-dimensional problem into a game in
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which each firm chooses only its price. Indeed, as we show below, the FOC with respect to xi
in (2) is independent of rivals’ investment x−i and, under our assumptions, we can express xi
as a function of the firm’s quantity qi(·, ·).
Since we need to make this transformation into a one-dimensional problem to write the
n-firm aggregative formulation of the game that we use in Section 2.3, we follow the latter
approach.
Lemma 1. For any given value of (pi.p¯−i), there is a unique corresponding value of xi, and
each firm i’s bi-dimensional (investment and price) maximization problem can be rewritten as
one in a single choice variable (price).
Proof. Since there are no efficiency gains in the benchmark, the investment FOCs in (2) can
be rewritten as:
∂xi p˜ii = −c′(xi)qi(pi, p¯−i) = F ′(xi) ⇐⇒ −
F ′(xi)
c′(xi)
= qi(pi, p¯−i). (3)
We use −F ′(xi)/c′(xi) ≡ φ(xi). Since F ′(·) ≥ 0, c′(·) < 0, F ′′(·) ≥ 0 and c′′(·) ≥ 0, it follows
that φ′(·) ≥ 0:
φ′(xi) =
∂
∂xi
(
−F
′(xi)
c′(xi)
)
= −(F
′′(xi)c′(xi)− c′′(xi)F ′(xi))
(c′(xi))2
≥ 0. (4)
Hence, (3), together with the properties of φ(·), implies that φ(·) is invertible, and xi =
φ−1(qi(pi, p¯−i)) ≡ χ(qi(pi, p¯−i)), and, by the properties of the inverse functions, χ′(·) ≥ 0:19
for any given value of (pi.p¯−i), the equilibrium value of firm i’s investment is uniquely deter-
mined by that firm’s quantity.
We can then write firm i’s profits as a function in a single choice variable:
(pi − c(χ(qi(pi, p¯−i))))qi(pi, p¯−i)− F (χ(qi(pi, p¯−i))).
Q.E.D.
The lemma shows that xi is a function of the firm’s quantity qi according to the injective
relationship xi = χ(qi), with χ
′(·) ≥ 0 and χ(0) = 0. Hence, the problem of firm i can be
rewritten as
max
pi
pii(pi, p¯−i) ≡ (pi − c(χ(qi(pi, p¯−i))))qi(pi, p¯−i)− F (χ(qi(pi, p¯−i))), (5)
subject to
xi = χ(qi(pi, p¯−i)). (6)
In what follows, we assume that function pii satisfies the standard assumptions ensuring
that a unique regular symmetric interior equilibrium exists (see, e.g., Vives, 1999). Specifically,
these assumptions require that the FOCs are downward sloping and have a unique solution.20
Dropping functional notation for qi, firm i’s FOC with respect to pi is:
∂pipii = (pi − c(χ(qi)))∂piqi + qi −
dc(χ(qi))
dpi
qi − dF (χ(qi))
dpi
= 0, (7)
19Specifically, since φ is differentiable and χ is its inverse, φ′ = 1/χ′ and sign{φ′} = sign{χ′}.
20We then check that these conditions are satisfied in the parametric models we use to illustrate our results.
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where, invoking the envelope theorem,
dc(χ(qi))
dpi
qi +
dF (χ(qi))
dpi
= qic
′(χ(qi))χ′(qi)∂piqi + F
′(χ(qi))χ′(qi)∂piqi
= [c′(χ(qi))qi + F ′(χ(qi))]χ′(qi)∂piqi
= 0
by the equilibrium condition in (6) and qi = −F ′/c′ (see equation (3) in the proof of Lemma
1). Then, the FOC in (7) can be written as
∂pipii = (pi − c(χ(qi)))∂piqi + qi = 0. (8)
Under the assumptions above, these FOCs are sufficient for optimality. After imposing
symmetry, the solution of (8) gives the equilibrium value of the price in the benchmark, pb.
Plugging this pb into (6) gives us the unique symmetric equilibrium of a firm’s investment in
the benchmark, xb.21
Lemma 2. In the benchmark with n independent firms and simultaneous moves, there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium that features each firm setting a price pi = p
b and investing
xi = x
b, with i = 1, ..., n.
Before proceeding with the analysis of the merger, we note that, after accounting for the
dynamic efficiencies generated by investments, our pricing model may exhibit strategic com-
plementarity or substitutability depending on the primitives of our game. Indeed, the cross
derivative of pii with respect to pi and pj is given by
∂2pipjpii = (pi − c(χ(qi)))∂2pipjqi + ∂pjqi − c′(χ(qi))χ′(qi)∂pjqi∂pjqj,∀j 6= i, (9)
with c′ < 0 and χ′ ≥ 0 - while it would be (pi − c)∂2pipjqi + ∂pjqi absent investments. The
sign of (9) depends on the shape of demand and cost functions. Thus, fixing c = c(χ(qi)), the
“dynamic” reaction function solving (8) may slope downward or upward.
2.1.2 Merger between firm i and firm k
Next, consider the merging firms’ problem. Recall that the merger may generate efficiency gains
(measured by λ) at the investment stage. Merging firms i and k choose prices and investments
to maximize p˜ii,k ≡ p˜ii(pi, p¯−i, xi) + p˜ik(pk, p¯−k, xk) + λG(xi, xk):
max
pi,pk,xi,xk
p˜ii,k = (pi − c(xi))qi(pi, p¯−i) + (pk − c(xk))qk(pk, p¯−k)
−F (xi)− F (xk) + λG(xi, xk), i, k = 1, ..., n, i 6= k.
The FOCs with respect to pi and xi are (we omit those for pk and xk, which are symmetric):
∂pi p˜ii,k = qi(pi, p¯−i) + ∂piqi(pi, p¯−i)(pi − c(xi)) + ∂piqk(pk, p¯−k)(pk − c(xk)) = 0,
∂xi p˜ii,k = −∂xic(xi)qi(pi, p¯−i)− F ′(xi) + λ∂xiG(xi, xk) = 0.
21The following lemma holds for any demand function which satisfies the (mild) regularity conditions given
above. In Section 2.3 we shall state a similar lemma which will hold only for demand functions which are
consistent with an aggregative game formulation.
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Moreover, an outsider firm j 6= i, k solves the following problem:
max
pj ,xj
p˜ij(pj, p¯−j, xj) = (pj − c(xj))qj(pj, p¯−j)− F (xj),
so that its FOCs are isomorphic to those of a firm in the benchmark, independently of the value
of the efficiency gains λ, which affect the merging firms:
∂pj p˜ij = qj(pj, p¯−j) + ∂pjqj(pj, p¯−j)(pj − c(xj)) = 0,
∂xj p˜ij = −c′(xj)qj(pj, p¯−j)− ∂xjF (xj) = 0.
Let us make some preliminary observations following simple inspection of the FOCs in the
benchmark and merger configurations (in the following subsections we shall dwell more upon
the effects mentioned here). First of all, both the price and investment FOCs of the outsiders
do not change with the merger, so it will affect the outsiders’ choices only through their best
responses to the insiders’ post-merger optimal choices.
Second, absent efficiency gains (λ = 0), the investment FOCs of the insiders are the same
too, with and without the merger. Investments will be affected by changes in the quantities:
in particular, the lower qi(pi, p¯−i) the lower the marginal revenue from investing and hence the
lower investment levels at equilibrium. With efficiency gains (λ > 0), instead, the merger will
decrease investment costs relative to the benchmark, and stimulate insiders’ investments, which
in turn will decrease marginal costs of production c(xi) and will tend to decrease prices.
Third, absent efficiency gains the merger effects will be mainly driven by the new term
which appears in the insiders’ price FOCs (∂piqk(pk, p¯−k)(pk − c(xk)) > 0): when setting the
price of product i, the merged entity will internalize the impact of pi on the quantity demanded
of good k. This is the standard market power effect of mergers that we all know, and that will
tend to raise prices after the merger. With efficiency gains, this effect may be outweighed by
the decrease in marginal costs identified above.
While these forces are clear at first sight, the identification of the net effect of the merger
on all the relevant variables at equilibrium is not straightforward. Consider for instance the
simpler case of no efficiency gains. The insiders’ prices will increase with the merger. With
strategic complementarity on prices, we know that this will tend to increase outsiders’ prices
as well, but (under regularity conditions) to a lower extent. Hence, outsiders’ quantities will
tend to rise because outsiders set a better relative price. But, since the higher qj(pj, p¯−j) the
higher the investments xj, this will tend to decrease the production costs of outsiders, which
feeds back into the outsiders’ price FOCs and will tend to decrease their prices. A priori, we
are not able to say whether the ultimate effect will be to increase or decrease the outsiders’
prices.
Furthermore, although intuitively the main effects of the merger will come from the direct
price increase of the insiders and the following effects will be indirect and of a lower order of
magnitude, we need to find a rigorous framework to assess the net effects of the merger, also
taking into account that with differentiated products - unlike with homogenous goods - we need
to aggregate the effects deriving from the quantities sold of different products. This is where
the aggregative game formulation we adopt in Section 2.3 will be of help. Before that, though,
we analyze the effects of a merger to monopoly.
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2.2 A merger to monopoly
Let us analyze the effect of a merger in an industry where there are only two firms, but without
making restrictive assumptions on the demand function. Focusing on two firms allows us to
disregard the indirect effects which may take place through the outsiders to the merger.
We first establish that, absent merger-induced efficiency gains (λ = 0), the merger to
monopoly raises prices and reduces investment. Then, we consider efficiency gains (λ > 0)
and identify the level of λ such that the merger will expand the firms’ investments and benefit
consumers. Proceeding as in Lemma 1, the merging firms’ problem in prices and investments
can be rewritten as a problem in pi and pk only; thus, the corresponding (standard) second
order conditions are:
(A0 ): ∂2pipipii,k < 0, ∂
2
pkpk
pii,k < 0, (∂
2
pipi
pii,k)(∂
2
pkpk
pii,k) > (∂
2
pipk
pii,k)
2,
where pii,k is the merged entity’s profit function. In what follows, we assume that these condi-
tions hold true both with and without efficiency gains at any interior maximum. Due to the
absence of outsiders, they will guarantee that the FOCs are sufficient for optimality.
2.2.1 No efficiency gains: λ = 0.
Consider first what happens when efficiency gains are absent : λ = 0. The proposition below es-
tablishes that the merger will decrease investments and increase prices, thereby unambiguously
harming consumers.
We set up the merging firms’ maximization problem:22
max
pi,pk
pii,k ≡ pii(pi, pk) + pik(pk, pi) (10)
subject to
xi = χ(qi(pi, pk)) (11)
xk = χ(qk(pk, pi)), (12)
where pii is defined in (5). Solving this problem, and considering the benchmark above under
n = 2, yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1. With simultaneous moves and absent merger-induced efficiency gains, a merger
to monopoly will raise the equilibrium price and decrease investments.
Intuitively, this result is the consequence of the effects discussed above: given the internal-
ization of the price effect of one product on the demand of the other, at the price and investment
levels of the benchmark equilibrium (given by Lemma 2) the merged firms will want to raise
prices. This will reduce quantities sold which, in turn, will make them want to decrease invest-
ments. But since lower investments will imply higher production cost, this effect will reinforce
the increasing effect on the price.
22Note that, if λ = 0, the merging firm’s FOCs for investments is isomorphic to the one in the benchmark in
(2).
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2.2.2 Efficiency gains: λ > 0.
Next, consider the case where λ > 0. The following lemma establishes a monotonic relationship
between the level of efficiency gains λ and the equilibrium values of the merger: as λ increases,
investments increase and prices fall. Note that this lemma holds for any λ, and therefore also
describes what happens when efficiency gains increase from λ = 0.
Lemma 3. Consider an equilibrium solution (pm (λ) , xm (λ)) of the merged entity problem
corresponding to a given level λ of efficiency gains. As λ increases, the merger equilibrium price
will decrease and the merger equilibrium investment will increase: ∂λp
m (λ) < 0, ∂λx
m (λ) > 0.
To understand the lemma, suppose that there are no efficiency gains and that the merged
entity is at its optimal price and investment choice. Now, if λ became positive (no matter how
small), the merged entity will find it optimal to increase investments, because they are cheaper.
As a result, production costs will be lower, which will push the firm to lower prices (which,
through higher quantities demanded, will push it to further adjust investments upwards, and
so on). So, the higher the efficiency gains the lower prices and the higher investment levels.
Next, we identify a level of efficiency gains such that investment levels are the same with
and without merger.
Lemma 4. With simultaneous moves, if the level λb of efficiency gains is such that a merger
to monopoly results in the same level of investments as in the benchmark, xm(λb) = xb, then at
λb, the merger will result in higher prices than at the benchmark: pm(λb) > pb.
2.2.3 Comparisons between benchmark and merger equilibrium
Armed with the two previous lemmas we can now characterize the benchmark and the merger
equilibrium solutions as a function of the efficiency gains. In particular, we know that for λ = 0
the merger leads to lower investments and higher prices; that as λ increases, the benchmark
solutions do not change (when firms are independent they do not benefit from efficiency gains),
and the merger performs better (prices decrease and investments increase with λ); that there
exists a level of efficiency gains λb such that the investment at the merger equilibrium equals the
investment at the benchmark equilibrium, but that at that level the merger price is still higher
than at the benchmark. Hence, by the monotonicity of the solutions with respect to λ, if there
exists a λ˜ > λb such that pm(λ˜) = pb then it must be that xm(λ˜) > xb. This also implies that
even if the merger was showed to entail sufficient efficiency gains to increase investments, this
may not be sufficient to infer that the merger is competitively neutral (not to say beneficial):
there will exist an interval λ ∈ (λb, λ˜) for which the merger raises investments but also the
prices, thereby affecting negatively consumer welfare.
The following summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 2. In a merger to monopoly, for low efficiency gains, 0 ≤ λ < λb, the merger will
lead to lower investments and higher prices; for intermediate levels, λb ≤ λ < λ˜, the merger
(weakly) increases investments but increases prices; only for high efficiency gains (λ ≥ λ˜) will
the merger (weakly) reduce prices and be pro-competitive.
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2.3 The effects of a merger in a n-firm industry
In this section, we analyze the consequences of the merger in an industry with n ≥ 3 firms.
We will study how prices and investments change after the merger by exploiting methodologies
borrowed from aggregative game theory (e.g., Selten, 1970; Jensen, 2010; Cornes and Hartley,
2012). In line with the rest of the paper, we use the assumption of symmetry.23
By Lemma 1, we can recast our price-and-investment simultaneous game into a single-
variable problem (pi), under the condition that xi = χ(qi(pi, p¯−i)) for all i. This allows us to
write the firm’s profit maximization problem as an aggregative game, that is, a game in which
a firm’s payoff pii is a function of its own action (ai) and the sum of the actions of all the n
firms in the industry, the aggregate, A =
∑n
i=1 ai.
Specifically, we focus on the classes of quasi-linear indirect utility functions of the following
type:
V (p¯) =
∑
i∈N
h(pi) + Ψ
(∑
i∈N
ψ(pi)
)
,
with ψ, Ψ and h(pi) continuous and thrice continuously differentiable, ψ
′(pi) < 0 and Ψ′(·) > 0.
By Roy’s identity, the ensuing demand function for product i is given by
qi(pi, p¯−i) = −h′(pi)− ψ′(pi)Ψ′
(∑
j∈N
ψ(pj)
)
. (13)
Nocke and Schutz (2016) show that, with n ≥ 3 asymmetric products, this demand function
has an aggregative formulation - a fortiori, this result extends to our framework with n ≥ 3
symmetric goods. In particular, since ψ(·) is strictly decreasing, we can rewrite the demand
in (13) as a function of ai ≡ ψ(pi) and its summation A ≡
∑
i∈N ψ(pi) only, i.e., qi(ai, A) =
−h′(ψ−1(ai))− ψ′(ψ−1(ai))∆′ (A). Accordingly, we will rewrite pii(pi, p¯−i) as pii(A, ai).
Since the interval of values of pi is compact, so is the one of ai. We further assume that
dqi/dai > 0, with dqi/dai = ∂aiqi + ∂Aqi, ∂ajqi < 0, i 6= j, and dqi/dai + ∂ajqi > 0.24
We now discuss the properties of our demand system:
1. If h′(pi) = 0, the demand in (13) satisfies IIA, because qi/qj = ψ′(pi)/ψ′(pj). Prominent
examples of demand functions that fall into this category are the logit and CES demand
models. As far as the logit is concerned, recall that
qi =
exp{(s− pi)/µ}
exp{(s0 − p0)/µ}+
∑n
j=1 exp{(s− pj)/µ}
, (14)
where s0, s ∈ R are quality parameters, µ the degree of preference heterogeneity, and
the outside good j = 0 has a price p0 = 0. It can be written in aggregative terms by
setting ai = exp{(s − pi)/µ}. The CES function features qi = p−r−1i /
∑n
j=1 p
−r
j , where
r = ρ/(1 + ρ) and ρ measure products’ substitutability. Its aggregative formulation
requires ai = p
−r
i .
23As discussed in Section 3.1, the main results below extend to the more general case with asymmetric firms.
24These assumptions are satisfied by the three specific demand functions we consider as main examples - CES,
logit and linear demand.
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2. If h′(pi) 6= 0, the demand system fails to satisfy the IIA property. A function that falls
into this category is the Shubik-Levitan demand system,
qi =
(α− pi)[1 + (n− 1)γ]− γ
∑n
j=1(α− pj)
(1− γ)[1 + (n− 1)γ] , (15)
where α is the intercept and γ ∈ (0, 1) measures product substitutability. In this case,
ai = (α− pi).
As we shall see, whether the IIA property holds has consequences for our welfare analysis.
The reason is that under the IIA consumer surplus only depends on A; thus, proving that the
aggregate falls with the merger will imply a fall in consumer surplus.
Outline of this sub-section We shall analyze this aggregative game formulation by applying
the toolkit developed in Anderson et al. (2016). First, we state the assumptions behind the
aggregative game analysis; second, we construct firm i’s inclusive reaction function r˜i(A) to the
aggregator A (Selten, 1970). We shall then write the aggregate inclusive reaction
∑n
i=1 r˜i(A).
The equilibrium will then be determined as the fixed point of the problem
∑n
i=1 r˜i(A) = A.
The same procedure will be applied for both the benchmark and the merger, and we shall then
proceed to the analysis of the effects by comparing the two equilibria. After carrying out the
analysis in general, we shall develop the full analysis with a particular demand function, as an
illustration of the methodology.
2.3.1 Assumptions on payoffs
In the aggregative formulation of the game, the profit function of firm i is
pii(A, ai) =
(
ψ−1(ai)− c (χ (qi(A, ai)))
)
qi(A, ai)− F (χ(qi(A, ai))) , (16)
with xi = χ(qi(A, ai)) for all i.
Let A−i = A− ai denote the sum of all firms’ actions but firm i’s (so that A−i =
∑
j 6=i ai).
Then, a firm’s profit function in the aggregative game can be written as pii(A−i + ai, ai). More-
over, we set pii(A−i + 0, 0) = 0 and denote ri(A−i) as the standard best reaction function - so
that ri(A−i) = arg maxai pii(A, ai). We assume that pii satisfies
(A1 ): ∂A−ipii(A−i + ai, ai) < 0 ∀ai > 0.
Assumption (A1 ) means that an increase in the actions of the rivals reduces firm i’s profits.
Recall that a firm’s action ai varies inversely with its price (as ψ
′ < 0); thus, when other firms
increase their action, this amounts to a fall in their prices. (A1 ) implies that, by raising their
own action ai, firms impose a negative externality on each other.
We also assume that:
(A2 ): ∂2aiaipii(A−i + ai, ai) < 0 at any interior maximum.
Assumption (A2 ) is the equivalent of the standard assumption made in Section 2 requiring
profit function’s concavity. As a direct implication of Assumption (A2 ), the standard reaction
function of firm i to other firms’ actions, ri(A−i), exists, is continuous and solves
dpii(A−i + ai, ai)
dai
= ∂Apii(A−i + ai, ai) + ∂aipii(A−i + ai, ai) = 0 (17)
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for interior solutions.
Finally, we assume that
(A3 ): ∂aiaipii(A−i + ai, ai) < ∂aiA−ipii(A−i + ai, ai),
which guarantees that reaction functions are well-behaved.
One can verify that these assumptions are satisfied, for instance, for logit, Shubik-Levitan
and CES demands if the cost structure exhibits constant returns of scale (e.g., c(x) = c − x)
and the investment cost function is quadratic (e.g., F (x) = x2/2).
Although we lay out our game as one of price competition, the reformulation of a firm’s
profit function in (16) implies that, as already discussed above, the firms’ choice variables
are not necessarily in a relationship of strategic complementarity. Thus, in the aggregative
game formulation of our analysis we might have either strategic complementarity, so that
∂aiA−ipii(A−i + ai, ai) > 0 or strategic substitutability, so that ∂aiA−ipii(A−i + ai, ai) < 0. In the
first case ri(A−i) is upward sloping. In the second, ri(A−i) is downward sloping.25 We then say
that ri(A−i) takes positive values for all Ai ≤ A−i. Instead, ri(A−i) = 0 for all A ≥ A−i.26
2.3.2 Construction of the inclusive reaction function
So far, we have derived the standard reaction function ri, as a function of A−i. Next, we
construct the inclusive reaction function of firm i to the value of the aggregator A, which
includes its own action ai. We will denote it by r˜i(A). To begin with, we remark some useful
properties of ri(A−i):
Lemma 5. Assumptions (A2) and (A3) imply that r′(A−i) > −1. Then, A−i + ri(A−i) is
strictly increasing in A−i.
As a consequence of the monotonicity established in the lemma, with both strategic com-
plementarity and strategic substitutability, the aggregate A defined at the value of the best
response of firm i (A−i + ri(A−i)) is increasing in A−i. We are now in the position to derive the
inclusive reaction function r˜(A).
The monotonicity of A−i + ri(A−i) implies that we can invert A−i + ri(A−i) ≡ hi(A−i) = A,
to obtain A−i = h−1i (A) ≡ fi(A). Given this, we can write r˜i(A) ≡ ri(fi(A)). Lemma 6 follows:
Lemma 6. Assumption (A3) implies that dr˜i/dA is given by r
′
i/(1+r
′
i) < 1. Thus, with strategic
complementarity, r′i > 0 implies that the inclusive reaction function is strictly increasing in the
aggregate A. With strategic substitutability, r′i ∈ (−1, 0) means that the inclusive reaction
function is strictly decreasing for all A < A−i.
To conclude this section, we provide a result that will be useful to establish the profitability
of the merger. Before doing so, we find it useful to denote by p¯ii(A) ≡ pii(A, r˜i(A)) the value of
firm i’s profit when it maximizes its profit given the actions of the others and doing so results
in an aggregate of value A.
25For instance, in the benchmark, if c(x) = c−x and F (x) = x2/2, then actions will be strategic complement
under the logit demand function, strategic substitutes under the Shubik-Levitan demand, and could be either -
depending on the value of r, under the CES demand function.
26Intuitively, since the higher ai the more aggressive the action, when rivals are very aggressive, A−i is so
large that firm i’s best reply is ai = 0.
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Lemma 7. Under Assumptions (A1)–(A3), p¯i(A) is strictly decreasing in A < A−i and is zero
otherwise.
We proceed by characterizing the equilibrium of the aggregative game in the benchmark
and with the merger.
2.3.3 Benchmark with independent firms
Given the derivation of the inclusive reaction function, we proceed to establish the conditions
for the existence of the equilibrium with independent firms. Specifically, an equilibrium exists
if it exists a fixed point of the following problem:
n∑
i=1
r˜i(A) = A. (18)
Lemma 8. In the benchmark with n independent firms, an equilibrium Ab of the aggregative
game always exists. Moreover, the value of Ab is unique if, at any fixed point, it holds true that
n∑
i=1
r˜′i(A
b) < 1. (19)
Condition (19) is the equivalent of the standard stability condition that we impose in As-
sumption (A4 ) of the main model. It implies that the value of
∑n
i=1 r˜i(A) intersects A from
above and, given the properties of r˜i, it means that the equilibrium value of A is unique.
27
2.3.4 Merger between firm i and firm k
Let firms i and k merge. Merged firms solve
max
ai,ak
pii(A, ai) + pik(A, ak). (20)
Under the assumption that (A1 )–(A3 ) are satisfied by the sum of merging firms’ profits, the
ensuing FOC with respect to ai is sufficient for optimality:
28
∂Apii(A, ai) + ∂aipii(A, ai) + ∂Apik(A, ak) = 0. (21)
In line with the analysis of the main model equilibrium conditions in Section 2.1, the FOC in
(21) differs from the benchmark because the merged entity takes into account the impact of
changing ai on the profit of firm k.
Solving for the FOCs of the insiders, and constructing the respective inclusive best reaction
functions, yields r˜mi (A) and r˜
m
k (A), with r˜
m
i (A) + r˜
m
k (A) ≡ R˜m(A).
27Note also that Lemma 8 is the equivalent of Lemma 2 for the aggregative formulation of the game.
28The FOC with respect to ak is analogous, thus omitted. Nocke and Schutz (2016) analyze existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium in an aggregative formulation of the oligopolistic pricing game with multi-product
firms. They show that these properties apply to the class of demands that we take as leading examples (and in
particular, the logit, linear and CES demand systems) under constant returns to scale and no fixed costs; thus,
their results do not directly extend to our analysis. We then checked that our assumptions are satisfied by these
three demand functions.
15
Lemma 9. Assume firms i and k merge. Then, for any A, r˜mi ≤ r˜i(A) and r˜mk ≤ r˜k(A); thus,
r˜i(A) + r˜k(A) > R˜
m(A).
For given value of the aggregator A, merged firms choose less aggressive actions (i.e., higher
prices in our Bertrand game with differentiated products), thus commanding a reduction of
respective actions ai and ak. Since the merger only affects the inclusive best response functions
of the insiders, the equilibrium value of the aggregate under the merger solves the following
fixed point problem:
Σ˜m(A) ≡
n∑
j 6=i,k
r˜j(A) + R˜
m(A) = A. (22)
By Lemma 9, the value of A that solves (22), Am, is strictly lower than the corresponding value
in the benchmark: Am < Ab.29 Moreover, if dΣ˜m(A)/dA < 1, then Am is unique. All this yields
the following result:
Proposition 3. Assume firms i and k merge. The aggregate falls from Ab to Am. Hence, the
sum of the profits of all firms in the industry go up.
With strategic complementarity, the merger is profitable for insiders and outsiders. Indeed,
by decreasing the value of the aggregate, the merger raises the profits of insiders (since p˜ii(A)
decreases in A). Moreover, by strategic complementarity, this makes outsiders’ profits increase,
too. These results rely on the intuition in Deneckere and Davidson (1985). However, with
strategic substitutability, the merger is not necessarily profitable.30 All this has implications
when we look at specific models: when actions are strategic complements in the aggregative
formulation, merger profitability will always be guaranteed, whereas when they are strategic
substitutes, we had to check that the merger is profitable.
2.3.5 Implications for consumer welfare
We proceed by determining the consequences of the merger for consumer welfare.
Proposition 4. If the demand function satisfies the IIA property, in an industry with n firms,
a merger between two firms i and k reduces consumer surplus.
This proposition follows from two considerations. First, by Lemma 9, the equilibrium value
of the aggregate under the merger is lower than in the benchmark. Therefore, if consumer
welfare depends only on the equilibrium value of the aggregate, showing that the aggregate fall
implies that the industry becomes less competitive. Anderson et al. (2016) show that this is the
case in Bertrand (pricing) games with differentiated products where demand satisfies the IIA
property.31 This class of demand functions include the logit and CES demand systems. It does
not include linear differentiated products demand systems, like the Shubik and Levitan demand
function in (15). This does not necessarily mean that the merger will increase consumer surplus
but simply that the sufficient condition in the proposition cannot be applied. In fact, in the
parametric analysis developed below, we find that the merger does reduce consumer surplus
also in the Shubik-Levitan model whenever the merger turns out to be profitable.
29Existence is guaranteed by the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 8.
30See Salant et al. (1983). Recall that in our game even if prices are strategic complements the existence of
investments may turn actions in the aggregative formulation of the game into strategic substitutes.
31Recall that the IIA property holds true if the ratio of any two demands depends only on their own prices
(and is independent of the prices of other options in the choice set).
16
2.3.6 Implications for investments
Proposition 3 shows that, as a consequence of the fall in insiders’ actions established in Lemma 9,
the aggregate falls with the merger. Thus, if the industry quantity Q increases in the aggregate
A, the merger reduces the total industry quantity, too. Among others, this property is satisfied
by the logit and Shubik-Levitan demand functions. Specifically, for the logit demand system
in (14), total quantity Q is given by A/(exp{s0} + A), and thus is strictly increasing in the
aggregate for any finite value of s0.
32 Similarly, in the linear products demands a` la Shubik and
Levitan in (15) one has that Q = A/(1 + 2γ).
What are the implications of this property for investments? Consider the simple case fea-
turing a constant returns to scale technology (c(x) = c − x) and quadratic investment cost
(F (x) = x2/2). Then, Lemma 1 implies that xi = qi, so that Q =
∑
i xi, i.e., total investments
are equal to Q. As a direct consequence, a merger that reduces industry quantity also reduces
investments. Next, we prove that this result holds for any admissible function χ(·).
Proposition 5. If the industry quantity rises with the aggregate A, then, in an industry with
n symmetric firms, the merger between firms i and k reduces total investments.
This result establishes that a sufficient condition for the merger to reduce total investments
is that the fall in the aggregate A implies a reduction in the aggregate demand Q - as is the case
for demand functions as logit and Shubik Levitan demand functions. For the CES, the sufficient
condition cannot be used as Q does not depend only on A. Nonetheless, we note two things:
first, the merger will reduce total quantity also with the CES demand function when actions
are strategic complements. We will then illustrate by means of specific parametric examples
that investments fall with the CES also when actions are strategic substitutes.33
2.3.7 Efficiency gains: λ > 0
We now consider the case of efficiency gains from the merger. Since the benchmark is the same,
we turn directly to the analysis of the merger.
Assume firms i and k merge. In the presence of efficiency gains, the merged firm solves
max
ai,ak
pii(A, ai|λ) + pik(A, ak|λ), (23)
where
pii(A, ai|λ) + pik(A, ak|λ) =
(
ψ−1(ai)− c (χ (qi(A, ai)|λ))
)
qi(A, ai)− F (χ(qi(A, ai)|λ))
+
(
ψ−1(ak)− c (χ (qk(A, ak)|λ))
)
qk(A, ak)− F (χ(qk(A, ak)|λ))
+G (χ(qi(A, ai)|λ), χ(qk(A, ak)|λ)) ,
and xi = χ(qi(·)|λ) and xk = χ(qk(·)|λ) are constructed as in the proof of Lemma 3 for the case
of n = 2.34
32This demand function is instead constant in the aggregate in the absence of the outside good (i.e., for all
s0 → −∞).
33Notably, under linear variable cost and quadratic fixed cost assumptions, for all values of r which make the
merger profitable.
34The profit function of an outsider firm j is as in (16).
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To establish how λ affects the equilibrium value of prices and investments, we first review the
result in Anderson et al. (2016) that derives the condition under which ri shifts up. Specifically,
take the inclusive best response function ri(·) constructed in Lemmas 5–7 above. Then, consider
an exogenous shift in λ:
Lemma 10. The inclusive reaction function of the insiders, ri(A|λ), moves upwards with λ:
dri(A|λ)/dλ > 0.
We then establish the impact of efficiency gains on the aggregate. Specifically, since merged
firms solve the problem in (23), the ensuing FOC with respect to ai is:
∂Apii(A, ai|λ) + ∂aipii(A, ai|λ) + ∂Apik(A, ak|λ) = 0.
Computing the corresponding inclusive best reaction functions yields r˜mi (A|λ) and r˜mk (A|λ),
with r˜mi (A|λ) + r˜mk (A|λ) ≡ R˜m(A|λ) > R˜m(A) - where the last result relies on Lemma 9 and
10. The higher the value of the efficiency gain λ, the more aggressive the actions of the merged
entity. In other words, actions ai and ak monotonically increase with λ.
Given R˜m(A|λ) > R˜m(A), the ensuing equilibrium value of the aggregate with efficiency
gains is larger than in the case with λ = 0. Specifically, since firms solve:
Σm(A|λ) ≡
n∑
j 6=i,k
r˜j(A) + R˜
m(A|λ) = A, (24)
the value of A that solves (24), Amλ , is strictly larger than the corresponding value without
efficiency gains: Am < Amλ . Existence of A
m
λ follows from the same arguments as in the proof
of Lemma 8 and, if dΣ˜m(A|λ)/dA < 1, Amλ is unique.
We conclude by establishing the uniqueness of the value of λ that renders the merger welfare
neutral with respect to the merger.
Lemma 11. Assume firms i and k merge. Then, there exists a unique value of λ such that
Am(λ˜) = Ab, with Am(λ˜) < Ab for all λ < λ˜ and Am(λ˜) ≥ Ab otherwise.
Conclusions of the case with efficiency gains We can now draw on the analysis made for
the case where λ = 0 to conclude the analysis of the merger with efficiency gains. In particular,
we know that - under the assumption that the IIA property holds - the effects on the consumer
surplus depend on whether the aggregate A increases or not with the merger.
Proposition 6. Assume firms i and k merge. If efficiency gains are small enough (λ < λ˜),
the merger reduces consumer surplus. Otherwise (λ ≥ λ˜), it will be (weakly) pro-competitive.
2.4 Specific functional forms models
In this section, we first use the Shubik and Levitan model to illustrate the functioning of the
aggregative formulation. We then resort to parametric models to get some further insights on
the effects of the merger on some variables of interest.
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2.4.1 Aggregative analysis with linear demand
In this section, we solve the linear demand example to illustrate the construction of the inclusive
best response function and the derivation of the equilibrium value of the aggregate. We will
do this for the benchmark, and provide a graphical illustration of how the merger changes the
aggregate in equilibrium.
Consider the Shubik-Levitan linear demand function. Its aggregative formulation is given
by
qi(A, ai) =
ai[1 + (n− 1)γ]− γ(ai + A−i)
(1− γ)[1 + (n− 1)γ] .
Assume also that c(x) = c− x and F (x) = x2/2, so that xi = χ(qi(A, ai)) = qi(A, ai).35
First, we find ri(A−i) by solving dpi(r(A−i) +A−i, r(A−i))/dai = 0 for r(A−i). Let us define
B ≡ [1 + (n− 1)γ]. We obtain the following expression:
ri(A−i) =
γ2A−i(1−B) +B(α− 1)(1− γ)(B − γ)
2Bγ2 − γ2 +B2(1− 2γ) .
We then invert A−i + ri(A−i) = A, to get A−i = fi(A). Specifically,
fi(A) =
Aγ −B[(α− 1)(1− γ)− A(1− 2γ)]
B(B − 2Bγ + γ2) (B − γ).
Inserting this fi(A) into ri(A−i), we obtain the inclusive best reaction function: r˜i(A) ≡
ri(fi(A)). In our symmetric Shubik-Levitan linear demand system, r˜i(A) = r˜(A) for all i:
r˜(A) =
γ2A(1−B) +B(α− 1)(1− γ)(B − γ)
B(B − 2Bγ + γ2) . (25)
To find the equilibrium value of the aggregate A in the benchmark, we then solve nr˜i(A) = A
and find that
A = Ab ≡ (α− 1)B(B − γ)(1− γ)n
B2(1− 2γ)− γ2n+Bγ2(1 + n) .
This Ab is unique by (A2 )–(A3 ) and nr˜′i(A) < 1. Specifically, in the benchmark,
(A2 ): B2(γ −B)[B(1− 2γ) + γ] < 0,
(A3 ): B(B − 2γB + γ2) > 0,
and are both satisfied for all γ ∈ (0, γ¯), with γ¯ ≡ (n− 3 +√n2 + 2n− 3)/2(2n− 3).
With the merger, the insiders’ inclusive reaction function is36
r˜m(A) =
Bγ[2− 2α(1− γ)− (2 + A)γ] + (α− 1)B2(1− γ)
B(B − 2Bγ + 2γ2) .
35Recall that ai = α− pi and A−i =
∑
j 6=i aj .
36We do not report the calculations for the derivation of r˜m because we followed the same procedure as in
the benchmark.
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To find the equilibrium value of the aggregate, we then solve 2r˜m(A) + (n− 2)r˜(A) = A, where
r˜(A), the inclusive best reaction function of the outsiders, is as in (25). The unique solution of
this fixed point problem is
A = Am ≡ (α− 1)B(1− γ){2γ
3n−B2(1− 2γ)n+Bγ[2 + n− 2γ(1 + 2n)]}
B(1− 2γ)[2γ2 − 3Bγ2 −B2(1− 2γ)]− (B − 1)γ2(B − 2Bγ + 2γ2)n.
With the merger, assumptions (A2 ) and (A3 ) hold true if
(A2 ): (B − 2γ)[2(B − 1)γ −B] < 0,
(A3 ): γ2(2− 3B)−B2(1− 2γ) < 0.
These conditions are again satisfied for all the positive values of γ below γ¯. Moreover, confirming
the result in Proposition 3, Am < Ab for all γ ∈ (0, γ¯).
In line with these findings, Figure 1 shows that the aggregate is smaller with the merger
for γ = 0.4 and n = 3. While the reduction in the aggregate is a sufficient condition for
consumer welfare to fall with demand functions like CES or logit, it is not with the Shubik-
Levitan demand model. The reason is that the latter does not satisfy the IIA. Hence, in what
follows, we look at how the merger changes consumer surplus with respect to the benchmark.
Before going there, though, we provide a graphical illustration of the conditions under which
assumptions (A2 ) and (A3 ) are satisfied in the model with linear demand, and the merger’s
profitability condition.
Figure 1: Benchmark and merger – Aggregative analysis with linear demand
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Note: the dashed line corresponds to the 45◦ line, the black line is the sum of inclusive reaction functions in the benchmark, the
grey line is the sum of inclusive reaction functions with the merger. The parametric values we use are α = 2, c = 1 and γ = 0.4.
As we show in Figure 2, right panel, the merger is profitable and anticompetitive when n = 3 and γ = 0.4 for any α > c.
In Figure 2, left panel, we illustrate two things: first, the condition implied by (A3 ) is more
binding than the one coming from (A2 ) in both the benchmark and the merger. Second, the
condition for (A3 ) in the benchmark implies the other three. In particular, the solid black line
corresponds to the maximum values below this assumption is satisfied, γ¯.
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Figure 2: Assumptions, consumer welfare, and profitability
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Note: in the left panel, the solid black (respectively, grey) line corresponds to the maximum value of γ such that assumption (A3 )
holds in the benchmark (respectively, merger). The black (respectively, grey) dashed line gives the maximum value of γ such that
assumption (A2 ) is satisfied in the benchmark (respectively, merger). In the right panel, the solid line gives the maximum value of
γ below which the merger is profitable, while the dashed line gives the maximum value of γ below which the merger implies a fall
in consumer surplus.
We now discuss the conditions for the merger to be profitable and its impact on welfare. In
the right panel of Figure 2, we plot two curves: the solid one gives the maximum values of γ such
that the merger is profitable, the dashed ones those below which it reduces consumer welfare.
This figure prompts two considerations. First, the profitability condition is more binding than
all the parametric assumptions (plotted in the left panel). Second, it shows that the merger is
anticompetitive whenever it is profitable.
Figure 3: Consumer surplus difference
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Note: the solid line plots the consumer surplus difference when γ = 0.3, the dashed line when γ = 0.1. The merger is profitable in
both cases for all n ≤ 10.
To conclude, we look at how the loss in consumer surplus caused by the merger (CSb−CSm)
evolves with the number of firms, n. It can be showed that as n grows, consumer loss shrinks.
(Figure 3 illustrates this result for different values of γ.) This confirms in a setting where firms
choose both investment and price what we know from standard merger theory, namely that
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the harm caused by a merger is - ceteris paribus - the more sizable the more concentrated
the industry. If antitrust authorities could prohibit only mergers which create “significant
lessening of competition” then they might limit their attention to mergers taking place in more
concentrated markets.
2.4.2 Parametric analysis
We have seen above that, absent efficiency gains, the merger leads to lower consumer surplus
for a class of models that we can write as aggregative games and satisfy the IIA property.
However, some models which are commonly used in industrial organization do not belong to
that class. Furthermore, dealing with closed-form solutions will also allow us to illustrate the
impact of the merger on all variables, thereby gaining further insight on merger effects.
In this section, therefore, we report parametric results for the study of the merger effects
for a model that does not satisfy the aggregative games properties, the Salop circle model, as
well as for models which can be written as aggregative games - namely the CES, logit and
Shubik-Levitan demand functions.
We restrict attention to n = 3 symmetric firms in the industry, the minimum number which
allows us to analyze the effects of the merger on insiders and outsiders (by looking at more than
three firms would complicate calculations without adding any additional insight). We assume
that marginal costs of production are linear, c(xi) = 1 − xi, that fixed costs are quadratic,
F (xi) = x
2
i /2, and (for the moment) that efficiency gains are absent, λ = 0.
37 Note that given
these assumptions, the FOCs with respect to investments, ∂xic(xi)qi(pi, p−i) − ∂xiF (xi) = 0
simplify to qi(pi, p−i) = xi, entailing the equivalence between outputs and investment levels at
all the equilibria.
Table 1 illustrates the results with particular parameter values. While we could obtain
analytical solutions for the Shubik-Levitan and the Salop models, we could not find closed-
form solutions with the CES and logit demand functions in the merger case (which entails
asymmetries). Thus, we report results for representative values of the parameters.
37See Section 3.5 below for a numerical computation of this model with efficiency gains, where we compare
the merger with the benchmark and a Research Joint Venture.
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Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes with simultaneous moves
Shubik-Levitan Salop CES Logit
a = 2, γ = 0.3 t = 0.9 t = 1.8 r = 1 r = 1.6 s0 → −∞ s0 = 0
pb 0.91 0.97 1.27 2.11 1.51 2.17 2.01
pmI 1.06 1.17 1.67 3.10 2.06 2.91 2.12
pmO 0.89 0.94 1.39 2.19 1.49 2.39 2.01
xb = qb 0.68 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.22 0.33 0.096
xmI = q
m
I 0.54 0.21 0.26 0.09 0.13 0.27 0.087
xmO = q
m
O 0.79 0.58 0.49 0.19 0.31 0.46 0.097
pib 0.17 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.137 0.44 0.101
pimI + pi
m
I 0.36 0.11 0.41 0.41 0.298 1.11 0.2
pimO 0.22 0.14 0.31 0.24 0.197 0.74 0.103
CSm − CSb -0.18 -0.10 -0.387 -0.24 -0.17 -0.54 -0.021
Wm −W b -0.09 0.02 -0.004 -0.15 -0.08 -0.24 -0.017
Note: with the merger, we denote an insider firm by I and an outsider firm by O. The Shubik-Levitan demand function is defined in (15).
For the Salop location model, we assume a linear transportation cost t and a circle of unit length. The CES demand function is given by
qi = p
−1−r
i /
∑
p−ri . For values r > 1.6 the merger is not profitable. Finally, the logit demand model is defined in (14). We use µ = 1, and
distinguish between s0 → −∞ ⇐⇒ exp{s0} = 0, which corresponds to the case without outside good, and s0 = 0, which corresponds to the
widely employed case in which exp{s0} = 1.
Description and interpretation of the results. In all the models analyzed it turns out
that the merger will harm consumers. This is mainly due to the insiders’ lower investments and
higher prices. In some cases, outsiders’ prices may decrease with the merger (due to their higher
investments) but in none of the cases analyzed to such an extent as to lead to a pro-competitive
effect.
To understand these results, we can refer to the mechanisms we have already stressed in
this section. When two firms merge, we know from the analysis of their price FOCs that they
will raise prices relative to the benchmark. Given investments, the outsider will also tend to
raise prices, but by less than the insiders. As a result, the quantity of the insiders fall and that
of the outsider increases. From the investment FOCs we know that firms’ investments increase
with the quantity sold: hence, insiders’ investments fall (their costs will then rise) and the
outsider’s investment rises (its production cost will fall), but total investments decrease. While
the investment effect reinforces the rise in the price of the insiders, it moves in the opposite
direction for the outsider, as the larger investment lowers its production costs and tends to
decrease its price. At the merger equilibrium, the price of the outsider may increase or decrease
relative to the benchmark. Indeed, the table above reports cases where the merger decreases
the outsider’s price.38
It is also worth stressing that in all models we have studied the merger always decreases
consumer surplus. Note that the merger always increases outsiders’ profits (they benefit from
the insiders’ higher prices and lower investments) and that we make assumptions aimed at
38These results also show that, in the aggregative formulation of our game, strategic complementarity holds
under the logit demand function and under the CES function for low enough values of r, e.g. for r = 1. With
the Shubik-Levitan demand, or CES demand with, e.g., r = 1.6, the firms’ actions are strategic substitutes,
implying that the merger increases insiders’ prices but lowers outsiders’. However, the fall in the actions of the
insiders is never outweighed by the increase in the actions of the outsiders.
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guaranteeing that the merger is profitable for the insiders.39 In principle the merger may raise
total surplus, and we do find that this may happen in the Salop model. Before making too much
of this result, though, consider that in the Salop model demand is completely inelastic (all the
market is covered and each consumer buys just one unit), hence there will be no dead-weight
loss from the merger’s higher prices.
Efficiency gains (λ > 0) We have carried out an analysis of the Shubik-Levitan and Salop
circle model (which do not satisfy the IIA property) under the assumption of efficiency gains,
and it confirms the results obtained above in Subsection 2.3.7: while at the benchmark the
equilibrium variables are not affected by the level of efficiency gains λ, as λ increases the
‘performance’ of the merger becomes better and better (total investments increase and consumer
surplus increases) until the merger becomes beneficial to consumers. In Section 3.5 below, we
shall report a graphical analysis which illustrates these findings.
3 Extensions
In this section, we study a few extensions of our main model. First, we relax the assump-
tion that firms’ products are symmetric. Second, we consider quality-enhancing investments
rather than cost-reducing investments. Third, we consider a sequential first-investments-then-
price game rather than a simultaneous move game. Fourth, we consider the possibility that
firms cannot perfectly appropriate their investments (involuntary spillovers). Finally, we study
market allocations and investments with a NSA/RJV.
3.1 Asymmetric products
The model has been solved under the assumption of symmetric goods. In this section, we
discuss the robustness of the results in Propositions 3, 4 and 5 when relaxing this condition.40
First of all, notice that nothing in the aggregative formulation of the model requires sym-
metry among the firms in the industry (indeed, the advantage of this approach is that it relies
on the aggregate of the actions, rather than its composition). Hence the derivation of the
benchmark equilibrium does not rely on an assumption of symmetry.
Next, consider the merger. The outsiders’ inclusive reaction functions are not affected by
the merger, and are the same as in the benchmark. As for the insiders, when we showed that the
merger reduces the value of their inclusive reaction functions (Lemma 9), symmetry allowed
us to rule out the case in which the new firm treats the two products differently. Consider
now the case in which the insiders’ products may be asymmetric. If the merged entity keeps
both goods active, then the proof proceeds as in Lemma 9, which means that both inclusive
39Notably, as substitutability among the products increases, competition becomes fiercer and the insiders will
lose more from being less efficient than outsiders (due to lower investments under the merger). Therefore, a
common restriction in the models is that products are sufficiently differentiated: this translates into assuming
a low enough γ in the Shubik-Levitan model, a large enough t in the Salop model, and a low enough r in the
CES model.
40Alternatively, one might consider a setting in which firms offer asymmetric product portfolios. While we
do not expect the results of the analysis to differ from a qualitative point of view, the challenging feature of
such an asymmetric model is that, based on the scant available literature on multi-product firms, it would be
complicated to establish existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium with and without the merger.
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best reply functions fall with respect to the benchmark. If instead the merged entity closes
down firm i’s good, then r˜mi (A) = 0 < r˜i(A). Hence, r˜
m
k (A) = r˜k(A). This means that
R˜m < r˜i(A) + r˜k(A) and the merger reduces the aggregate as it was the case with symmetric
products (i.e., Ab < Am).
What are the implications for consumer surplus? As argued after Proposition 4, a suffi-
cient condition for the merger to reduce consumer welfare is that the demand satisfies the IIA
property (or, equivalently, that the consumer surplus only depends on the aggregate, not on its
composition). Thus, with and without symmetry, the same condition is sufficient to show that
the merger is anticompetitive.
As far as total industry investment is concerned, the analysis in Proposition 5 proves the
fall in investments under the condition that total demand depends on the aggregate. Symmetry
allows us to streamline the comparison between the value of investments before and after the
merger, and then show that investments fall for any (weakly) concave investment function χ.
With asymmetric products the comparison is complicated by the fact that outsiders’ rise
in investments might more than compensate the fall in insiders’, even if total demand falls.
However, we obtain the same result as in the proposition if the investment function is linear in
x, e.g., q = ζx, with ζ > 0 – which holds true whenever −F ′(xi)/c′(xi) = ζxi (see the proof
of Lemma 1 for details). Then, ζ
∑
i xi =
∑
i qi and a merger that reduces industry quantity
decreases industry investments, too.
Finally, in the model with efficiency gains (Section 2.3.7), we use symmetry to simplify
the derivation of the investment function xi = χ(qi|λ). However, it is possible to operate our
transformation and solve the “price-only” model (and the aggregative version of it) even with
asymmetric firms. In that case, the investment function is obtained solving the FOCs for xi and
xk as function of qi and qk. Hence, symmetry is not necessary to derive the results, although
admittedly it greatly simplifies the analysis.
3.2 Quality-increasing investments
In this section, we discuss the implications of a model in which the investments carried out
by firms increase the quality of their good, rather than decreasing their cost of production.
Specifically, we let the quantity of a firm depend on its own and rivals’ prices (p) and quality
(x) level: qi = qi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i), with ∂xiqi ≥ 0 and ∂xiqk ≤ 0 (that is, an increase in the
quality of firm i implies that qi rises and qk reduces, with i 6= k, as standard in models of
quality differentiation). Consider further the case where the price- and quality-setting stages
take place simultaneously, the investment in quality does not generate any efficiency gains and
each firm bears a marginal cost of production equal to c.
If firms act independently, each solves the following maximization problem:
max
pi,xi
pˆii(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i) = qi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i)(pi − c)− F (xi), i = 1, ..., n.
The associated FOCs are:
∂pi pˆii = qi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i) + ∂piqi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i)(pi − c) = 0, (26)
∂xi pˆii = ∂xiqi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i)(pi − c)− F ′(xi) = 0. (27)
If firms i and k merge, they maximize pˆii,k ≡ pˆii(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i) + pˆik(pk, p¯−k, xk, x¯−k) with
respect to pi, pk, xi and xk, with i, k = 1, ..., n, and i 6= k. The FOCs with respect to pi and
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xi follow (we omit those for pk and xk, which are symmetric, and those of the outsiders, which
are the same as in the benchmark):
∂pi pˆii,k = qi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i) + ∂piqi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i)(pi − c)
+∂piqk(pk, p¯−k, xk, x¯−k)(pk − c) = 0, (28)
∂xi pˆii,k = ∂xiqi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x¯−i)(pi − c)
+∂xiqk(pk, p¯−k, xk, x¯−k)(pk − c)− F ′(xi) = 0. (29)
When investments increase a firm’s quality, the impact of the merger is a priori ambiguous.
Compare first the insiders’ FOCs with respect to prices, (26) and (28): under the merger there
is the usual internalization of price effects which - ceteris paribus - leads the merged entity
to raise prices. This will increase the marginal revenue from investing and will therefore tend
to increase the insiders’ incentive to invest. On the other hand, by comparing the investment
FOCs of the insiders, (27) and (29), it turns out that the merged entity will have a lower
incentive to invest: this is because it internalizes the fact that any extra dollar of investments
on product i will lower the demand of product k, which also belongs to the same firm. It is
therefore difficult to say whether insiders’ investments will increase or decrease with the merger.
As for the outsiders, their FOCs are not affected by the merger, but because of strategic
complementarity, outsiders’ prices would tend to rise, which in turn raises their incentives to
invest. But of course the change in the insiders’ investments will also affect their FOCs, so it
is difficult to reach an unambiguous conclusion about the effect of the merger on the outsiders
too.
3.2.1 Cost-reducing and quality-increasing: indifference results
Given the ambiguous conclusions of the general model with quality-increasing investment, we
show two formulations of the demand model under which the equilibrium results of the game
with cost-reducing investments are equivalent to those with quality-increasing investments.
Quality-adjusted model, and CES demand In our main model, the utility of the rep-
resentative consumer takes the following form U(q1, ..., qn). Assume now that the consumer’s
utility depends on xiqi. That is, U(x1q1, ..., xnqn). In this alternative model, the solution of the
utility maximization problem leads to a demand system as in xiqi = Di(zi, z¯−i), with zi = pi/xi
and i = 1, .., n.
In this context, the gross profits of a firm i is equivalent to the gross profits in our baseline
model when considering a quality adjusted value of marginal costs of production (c/xi):
pˆii + F (xi) = (pi − c)qi
= (zi − c/xi)Di(zi, z¯−i).
This equivalence means that all the conclusions derived in the model with cost-reducing in-
vestment extend to this model with quality-adjusted prices and investments.41 It also ex-
tends to any model where demand can be written as a function of the price-investment ra-
tio, as is the case, for instance, of the vertical product differentiation version of the CES
(qi = (pi/xi)
(r−1)/
∑n
j=1(pj/xj)
r).
41A model which presents this feature is the one used by Sutton (1998:58ff) and later used by, e.g., Symeonidis
(2003).
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Hedonic price transformation We now show that there exists another class of demand
models for which we can establish an equivalence between the results with cost-reducing and
quality-increasing investments.
Assume that qi(pi, p¯−i, xi, x−i) can be written as qi(pi − υ(xi), p¯−i − υ(x−i)), where qi is
decreasing in (pi − υ(xi)) and increasing in the elements of the vector p¯−i − υ(x−i), and where
υ(xj) increases in the investment xj for all j. This describes a model with quality-enhancing
investments (the higher xi the higher the perceived quality, and hence the demand for product
i) where each firm has profit
pii(pi, p¯−i, xi, x−i) = (pi − c)qi(pi − υ(xi), p¯−i − υ(x−i))− F (xi).
If one defines hi ≡ pi − υ(xi) as the hedonic price of the quality determined by xi, then the
profit function above is equivalent to:
pii(hi, h−i, xi, x−i) = (hi − (c− υ(xi)))qi(hi, h−i)− F (xi),
which is nothing else than the profit function of a firm i whose investment reduces its marginal
cost according to ci(xi) = c − υ(xi). This is like in the cost-reducing model we dealt with in
the previous section.
For instance, let us study a quality-enhancing version of the model by using a logit demand
function. In its vertical product differentiation version, this demand can be written as:
qi =
exp{(s+ υ(xi)− pi)}
exp{(s0 − p0)}+
∑n
j=1 exp{(s+ υ(xj)− pj)}
,
where 0 is the outside good, and each firm i has profit pii = (pi − c)qi(·, ·)− F (xi). By defining
the hedonic price hi = pi− υ(xi), the profit can be rewritten as: pii = (hi− c+ υ(xi))(exp{(s−
hi)})/(exp{(s0−p0)}+
∑n
j=1 exp{(s−hj)})−F (xi), which is a version of the cost-reducing model
we analyzed above. Not only the logit demand falls within this class of functions, but also the
Shubik-Levitan demand system (see Ha¨ckner, 2000) of the type qi = (αi−pi)β−γ
∑
j(αj−pj),
with αi = α + α(xi) measuring quality, β > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1). Specifically, this would be
equivalent to studying a model of cost-reducing investments ci = c − c(xi) with a demand
qi = (α− pi)β − γ
∑
j(α− pj).
In sum, some standard models where firms invest to enhance their quality can be rein-
terpreted as the cost-reducing models we have studied in the previous sections. Hence, the
same conclusions would apply: a merger is anti-competitive unless it entails sufficient efficiency
gains.42
3.3 The merger with involuntary spillovers
We have so far assumed that firms can fully appropriate their investments or innovations. While
this is a realistic assumption for many industries where physical or intellectual property rights
are typically well protected (think for instance of MNOs’ investments in telephone infrastruc-
ture, or a pharmaceutical company’s new molecule), there may be industries where involuntary
42Perhaps the most popular model of vertical product differentiation is the Shaked and Sutton model. In the
previous version of the paper we showed that even in that model (in which firms set sequentially qualities and
then prices) the merger decreases investments and consumer surplus.
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spillovers are substantial, due to e.g. imitation, or movement of research personnel among
firms. In this section, we show that involuntary spillovers have the same qualitative effect as
the efficiency gains in our analysis. In order to make the treatment of spillovers as close as
possible to the existing literature (see, e.g., d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988) we assume that
- in case of spillovers - the investment by a firm decreases the marginal cost of production
of a rival. We then solve our model under the assumptions that n = 2, F (xi) = x
2
i /2 and
c(xi, xk) = c−xi−σxk, where σ ∈ [0, 1] represents involuntary spillovers. We first consider the
benchmark, and then the merger.
At the benchmark, firm i’s problem is: maxpi,xi pi
inv
i = [pi − c+ xi + σxk] qi(pi, pk) − x2i /2,
for i, j = 1, 2; i 6= j. Solving the FOC with respect to the investment gives: xi = qi(pi, pk), and,
after replacement, firm i’s problem is in one variable only:
max
pi
piinvi = [pi − c+ σqk(pi, pk)] qi(pi, pk) +
(qi(pi, pk))
2
2
,
subject to xi = qi(pi, pk). The FOCs are given by:
∂pipi
inv
i = qi(pi, pk) + (pi − c) ∂piqi(pi, pk) + qi(pi, pk)∂piqi(pi, pk)
+σqi(pi, pk) (∂piqk(pi, pk) + ∂piqi(pi, pk)) = 0. (30)
Consider now the merger between the two firms, and assume away any possible cost sav-
ings (λ = 0). The merged entity’s problem is to maximize piinvi,k with respect to prices and
investments, with piinvi,k ≡
∑
i 6=k [pi − c+ xi + σxk] qi(pi, pk)− x2i /2.
Solving the FOC with respect to the investment xi (we omit the FOC with respect to j,
since it is identical) gives xi = qi(pi, pk)+σqk(pi, pk); thus, prices being equal, the merged entity
invests more because it internalizes that an investment in good i’s production will also benefit
good k. After replacing xi and xk the merged entity’s program becomes:
max
pi,pk
piinvi,k =
∑
i 6=k
(pi − c)qi(pi, pk) + (qi(pi, pk) + σqk(pi, pk))
2
2
.
Taking the FOC with respect to pi, and using symmetry, we obtain:
∂pipi
inv
i,k = qi(pi, pk) + (pi − c) ∂piqi(pi, pk) + qi(pi, pk)∂piqi(pi, pk)
+σ∂piqi(pi, pk) (qi(pi, pk) + qk(pi, pk))
+ (pk − c+ qi(pi, pk)) ∂piqk(pi, pk) + σ∂piqi(pi, pk) (qi(pi, pk) + qk(pi, pk))
+σ2 (qi(pi, pk)∂piqi(pi, pk) + qk(pi, pk)∂piqk(pi, pk)) = 0. (31)
We can now compare the ensuing equilibria by inspecting the FOCs at the benchmark
and at the merger, respectively (30) and (31). The first four terms of (31) are identical to
expression (30), hence at the benchmark equilibrium they must equal zero. If σ = 0, that
is, absent spillovers, the only difference between the two FOCs is represented by the term
(pk − c+ qi(pi, pk)) ∂piqk(pi, pk), which is the usual upward pricing pressure effect of mergers.
Therefore, absent spillovers the merger would lead to higher prices (and - after replacement
in the investment FOC - into lower investments). When σ > 0, however, there is an effect
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of opposite sign, that is, pushing prices downwards. Indeed, the last line in expression (31)
is negative. Therefore, the higher the spillover σ the more likely that the equilibrium price is
lower under the merger; and the investment will be higher, due both to the internalization of
the spillover and the lower price.
This means that there is a close parallel between the model with involuntary spillovers and
the model with economies of scale in the investment function: in both cases, the merger will
allow to internalize an externality.
3.4 Sequential choices
The game where firms simultaneously choose both cost-reducing investments and prices can
be interpreted as one where investments cannot be observed by rivals when firms take pricing
decisions. In this section, we look at sequential moves, i.e. the case where firms know all
investments made at the time they set prices.
As in the previous subsection, we begin by looking at the benchmark (status quo) case
with n symmetric independent firms, and then at the merger between two out of these n firms.
Unfortunately though, in the sequential moves case we cannot rely on either the transformation
from a bi-dimensional into a one-dimensional variable maximization problem or the aggregate
game formulation, so we shall limit ourselves to compare the FOCs at the benchmark and at the
merger, and resort to parametric models to gain some insight on the net effects of the merger.
3.4.1 Benchmark with independent firms
If firms act independently, in the second stage each firm i solves the following problem:
max
pi
p˜ii(pi, p¯−i, xi) = (pi − c(xi))qi(pi, p¯−i)− F (xi), i = 1, ..., n.
The FOCs are:
∂pi p˜ii(·) = qi(pi, p¯−i) + ∂piqi(pi, p¯−i)(pi − c(xi)) = 0. (32)
Assume the system of n FOCs is uniquely solved by the vector of equilibrium prices, p¯b(x¯) =(
pb1(x¯), p
b
2(x¯), ..., p
b
n(x¯)
)
, which is function of the vector x¯ = (x1, x2, ..., xn) of the n cost-reducing
investments.
In the first stage, firms maximize p˜ii
(
p¯b(x¯), xi
)
with respect to xi, which, invoking the
envelope theorem, yields the following system of FOCs:
∂xi p˜ii(·) = −c′(xi)qi(p¯b(x¯))− F ′(xi) + (n− 1)
dpbj
dxi
∂pjqi(p¯
b(x¯))(pbi(x¯)− c(xi)) = 0, (33)
for all i = 1, ..., n and j 6= i. The conditions in (33) define the equilibrium level of investment
in the sequential choice game with independent firms.43 The difference between (33) and (2) is
that, with sequential moves, each firm i takes into account that raising its investment reduces
the prices set by its rivals, and this will impact negatively own profits since it makes price
43For the stability and the unicity of the equilibrium at the investment stage in the benchmark and with the
merger, we invoke the conditions derived in Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987). We will check that they are satisfied
within the parametric models that we refer to below.
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competition more fierce. This effect is reflected by the last term in (33). As a consequence,
the equilibrium investment values in x¯b(p¯), as set by each firm i solving conditions (33) in the
benchmark model with sequential moves, will be lower than in the simultaneous moves case,
ceteris paribus.
3.4.2 Merger between firm i and firm k
In the second stage, the two merging firms i and k solve:
max
pi,pk
p˜ii,k = (pi − c(xi))qi(pi, p¯−i) + (pk − c(xk))qk(pk, p¯−k)− F (xi)− F (xk) + λG(xi, xk),
with i 6= k. The FOC with respect to pi (we omit that for pk which is symmetric) is:
∂pi p˜ii,k = qi(pi, p¯−i) + ∂piqi(pi, p¯−i)(pi − c(xi)) + ∂piqk(pk, p¯−k)(pk − c(xk)) = 0. (34)
These FOCs are the same as in the simultaneous moves case: thus, since ∂piqk(pk, p¯−k) ≥ 0 and
pk > c(xk) at the equilibrium, and for given investments, the merger increases the price set by
each insider with respect to the benchmark.
As for the outsiders, their FOCs will be the same as in the benchmark.
Let us call p¯m(x¯) the vector of the prices which solves the system of the n FOCs above, and
note that it will be composed of the two insiders’ prices, pmi (x¯) = p
m
k (x¯) and (n− 2) symmetric
outsiders’ prices pmj (x¯) with j 6= i, k.
In the first stage, insiders maximize joint profits p˜ii,k = p˜ii (p¯
m(x¯), xi) + p˜ik (p¯
m(x¯), xk) with
respect to xi and xk. Using the envelope theorem, the associated FOCs are as follows:
∂xip˜ii,k = −c′(xi)qi(p¯m(x¯))− F ′(xi) + λ∂xiG(xi, xk)
+(n− 2)dpj
dxi
[
∂pjqi(p¯
m(x¯))(pmi (x¯)− c(xi)) + ∂pjqk(p¯m(x¯))(pmk (x¯)− c(xk))
]
= 0(35)
for all j 6= i, k.44
As for the outsiders, their FOCs will have the same terms as those in the benchmark, except
that different prices are anticipated as solution of the last stage of the game:
∂xj p˜ij(·) = −c′(xj)qj(p¯m(x¯))− F ′(xj) +
∑
l 6=j
dpml
dxj
∂plqj(p¯
m(x¯))(pmj (x¯)− c(xj)) = 0. (36)
Let us now compare the FOCs with respect to investments in the merger, (35) and (36),
with those of the benchmark, (33). As for the insiders’, there are three different effects at work.
Two are of the same nature as in the simultaneous case: (i) since the insiders anticipate that
they will sell lower quantities than at the benchmark (qi(p¯
m(x¯)) < qi(p¯
b(x¯)) because insiders’
prices increase more than outsiders’), this will reduce the marginal revenue from investment,
consisting of the term −c′(xi)qi(p¯m(x¯)). This will tend to lower investments by insiders. (ii)
To the extent that efficiency gains exist (λ > 0), the term λ∂xiG(xi, xk) will decrease marginal
costs from investing, and hence will tend to increase insiders’ investments.
However, (iii) a new effect of the merger exists, and can be seen by comparing the last
“strategic” term on the left-hand side (LHS) of expressions (33) and (35). In the benchmark
44The FOC of an outsider is isomorphic to the one of a firm in the benchmark (33), and therefore not reported.
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configuration of the sequential game, each firm takes into account that investing an additional
dollar will lower its own costs and prices, but also (by strategic complementarity) the prices of
all the (n− 1) rivals - and this will impact negatively on own profits. A merged entity, though,
will take into account that an additional dollar invested in product i will lower the prices of the
(n − 2) outsiders, and that this will impact negatively on both the profits from product i and
from product k, and therefore tends to further reduce the incentive to invest by the merged
firms with respect to the benchmark.45
As for the outsiders’ FOCs, there will be a similar effect as in the simultaneous game: since
outsiders anticipate they will sell more than in the benchmark at the last stage of the game,
they will have a higher marginal revenue from investing, and this will raise their investments
at the merger equilibrium.
Beyond these considerations on the different effects at work, it is difficult to establish general
results on the net effect that a merger may have - even in the case where no efficiency gains
exist - due to the impossibility of resorting to an aggregative game formulation, which is not
available for sequential games.46 In order to get some insights into the effects of a merger in a
sequential game, we therefore turn to some specific functional form oligopoly models.
3.4.3 The merger in parametric models with sequential choices
We have studied the sequential game for two different standard differentiated product models,
the non-address model characterized by the Shubik-Levitan demand function, and the (address)
Salop circle model, under the same assumptions made in the simultaneous model. To illustrate
the results we report the solutions for particular parameter values in Table 2.
The results for the sequential model are of the same qualitative nature as for the simulta-
neous model. The merger always raises the insiders’ prices, and it may increase or decrease
the outsiders’ prices; it always lowers insiders’ investments and increases outsiders’, but with
the former effect dominating so that at equilibrium total investments are always lower than
at the benchmark; profits of insiders and outsiders alike increase with the merger; consumers
are always harmed by the merger, but total surplus may increase with the merger in particular
circumstances. To be more precise, it never increases in the Shubik-Levitan model, but in the
Salop model it rises for t ∈ [0.6, 0.746) - namely, for values where substitutability among the
goods is very high - and decreases for t ≥ 0.746 (we impose t ≥ 0.6 to ensure profitability of
the merger). Recall, though, that the Salop model is very special because aggregate demand is
completely inelastic, and the higher prices caused by the merger do not entail any deadweight
loss.
45The comparison between the two last terms in the FOCs (33) and (35), however, is somehow limited by
two other elements: (a) there are (n− 1) terms to be summed up in (33), but only (n− 2) in (35); and (b) the
marginal effect on own profits caused by a reduction in the rivals’ prices may differ because the marginal profits
are evaluated at two different price equilibria.
46Interestingly, in the sequential case even dealing with the merger to monopoly is not straightforward.
Consider for simplicity the case λ = 0. When n = 2, the strategic term ∂pjqi(p¯
b(x¯))(pbi (x¯) − c(xi))dpbj/dxi
disappears from the investment FOCs of the merged entity: while in the benchmark a firm will tend to reduce
its investment because it anticipates that this will make competition in the product market fiercer, the insiders’
will internalize this effect, so this effect would tend to increase investment relative to the benchmark: a priori,
we cannot establish whether this effect may or may not outweigh the effect (see (i) above) due to the lower sales
expected in the monopoly equilibrium.
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Table 2: Equilibrium outcomes with sequential moves
Shubik-Levitan Salop
a = 2, γ = 0.3 t = 0.9 t = 1.8
pb 0.93 0.97 1.33
pmI 1.08 1.17 1.78
pmO 0.92 1.02 1.53
qb 0.67 0.33 0.33
qmI 0.53 0.23 0.26
qmI 0.76 0.54 0.47
xb 0.65 0.27 0.27
xmI 0.51 0.15 0.18
xmO 0.73 0.36 0.31
pib 0.18 0.04 0.16
pimI + pi
m
I 0.37 0.12 0.47
pimO 0.23 0.14 0.35
CSm − CSb -0.18 -0.14 -0.35
Wm −W b -0.11 -0.002 -0.02
Note: we denote an insider firm by I and an outsider by O. The number of
firms is three and the specification of the demand models is as in Table 1.
3.5 Network Sharing Agreements and Research Joint Ventures
When assessing a merger proposal, the merger has to be compared with the likely counterfac-
tuals. The status quo (what we call benchmark) is an obvious counterfactual, but in the case of
efficiency gains from investment, another natural counterfactual candidate is a situation where
some firms agree upon investment decisions, while continuing to behave independently in the
product market. Examples of cooperative agreements at the investment stage include Research
Joint Ventures (RJVs), where firms set joint R&D programs but then independently market
their innovation, and Network Sharing Agreements (NSAs), where Mobile Network Operators
(MNOs) share infrastructure (such as sites, antennas, and other equipment) and/or spectrum,
but compete in the retail markets where they sell mobile services independently.
In this section, we consider this type of agreements. We assume that the members of a NSA
(or RJV), firms i and k, choose investment levels xi and xk to maximize joint profits, but they
choose prices to maximize individual profits. We consider the case of simultaneous investments
and price decisions.
Since we assume that NSA members i and k maximize joint profits when setting investment,
and behave non-cooperatively when setting the price,47 the FOCs of a NSA-member firm i are
47While this appears natural in a sequential move game, it may appear less so in a simultaneous move game.
However, NSAs are often structured in such a way that investment decisions are fully delegated to a separate joint
venture whose managers are to behave independently from the managers of the parent companies. Independence
between investment decisions and price decisions is also often a requirement of competition agencies to authorise
the NSA. Note that if the NSA were to maximize joint profits with respect to both investments and prices, it
would simply be identical to a merger.
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(we omit those for k, which are symmetric, and those for the outsiders, which are unchanged):
∂pi p˜ii,k = qi(pi, p¯−i) + ∂piqi(pi, p¯−i)(pi − c(xi)) = 0, (37)
∂xi p˜ii,k = −∂xic(xi)qi(pi, p¯−i)− ∂xiF (xi) +
λ
2
∂xiG(xi, xk) = 0. (38)
The FOC for the price is as in the benchmark (no merger), while the FOC for the investment
of an insider firm i is the same as in the merger. As we will show, this implies that, in the
simultaneous moves case, the NSA will (weakly) dominate the benchmark in terms of consumer
welfare, since it allows the members to the agreement to benefit from efficiency gains.
3.5.1 Comparing the NSA with the benchmark
We now provide a formal comparison between the NSA and the benchmark equilibrium out-
comes.
Let us begin with the case with n = 2 - we make use of the transformation of the model
in one-action only. Since investments are taken cooperatively by i and k, we can write the
maximization problem of a NSA member as maxpi pii(pi, pk|λ), subject to xi = χ(qi|λ), qi =
qi(pi, pk), and
pii(pi, pk|λ) = (pi − c(χ(qi|λ)))qi − F (χ(qi|λ)) + λ
2
G(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ)). (39)
In (39), we assume that NSA firms, being symmetric, equally share the efficiencies generated
by the deal. When comparing the equilibrium outcomes in the benchmark and in the NSA, we
then find the following.
Proposition 7. For n = 2, the NSA (weakly) lowers prices and (weakly) increases investments
with respect to the benchmark for any value of λ ≥ 0. This holds strictly for λ > 0. For n ≥ 3,
the NSA (weakly) raises the aggregate with respect to the benchmark for any value of λ ≥ 0.
The intuition behind this result comes from the fact that the NSA does not distort price
choices while at the same time allowing its members to benefit from cost savings in the invest-
ment function.
For the case of n ≥ 3 firms, we rely on the aggregative formulation and obtain an analogous
result: the NSA raises the aggregate with respect to the benchmark. It then increases consumer
surplus and investments under the sufficient conditions given in Section 2.3.
3.5.2 Comparing the NSA with the merger
What is more difficult to prove is that the NSA is superior to the merger from the point of view
of consumers: one cannot exclude a priori that responses by outsiders may more than offset the
effects on the insiders.48
We nevertheless can make use of the result in Propositions 2 (for n = 2) and Lemma 11
(for n ≥ 3) that it exists a threshold value of efficiency gains λ˜ such that, compared to the
48For instance, when comparing the merger and the NSA equilibria, the merger leads to higher prices by the
insiders and (by strategic complementarity) by the outsiders, a decrease in the quantities sold by the former
and an increase for the latter: in principle, it may be that the investments by the outsiders raise more than the
decrease in investments by the insiders.
33
benchmark, the merger lowers welfare for all λ < λ˜.49 Since the NSA clearly dominates the
benchmark for any value of λ, we then know that the NSA improves welfare with respect to
the merger for all λ < λ˜. For λ ≥ λ˜, both the merger and the NSA increase consumer welfare
when compared to the benchmark. The following corollary recapitulates:
Proposition 8. The NSA raises consumer welfare with respect to the merger for all λ < λ˜.
If λ ≥ λ˜, both the merger and the NSA increase consumer welfare when compared to the
benchmark.
3.5.3 Parametric analysis of the NSA
We now analyze the NSA within two specific functional forms models (the Shubik-Levitan and
Salop model we have seen above), and the comparison among the merger, benchmark and NSA
equilibrium outcomes suggest that the NSA is (weakly) better for consumers than both the
merger and the benchmark.
Figure 4, obtained for the Shubik-Levitan model, illustrates that for whatever level of effi-
ciency gains a NSA performs (weakly) better than both the merger and the benchmark: total
investments and consumer surplus are always strictly higher under the NSA (the same would
hold for total surplus) for any λ > 0, and they coincide with the benchmark equilibria for λ = 0.
In line with the analysis of the merger in Section 2.2, there exists a level λ of efficiency gains at
which the merger leads to higher investments than the benchmark (but never than the NSA)
but that a still higher level is necessary to offset the increase in prices: CSm =CS b at a higher
level of λ.50
Figure 4: Merger and NSA with efficiency gains and simultaneous moves
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
Λ
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Consumer Surplus, Total Investment
Note: the black lines refer to consumer surplus and the grey lines to total investments. Moreover, the solid lines correspond to the
benchmark, the dotted lines to the merger and the dashed lines to the NSA/RJV. The parametric values we use are n = 3, α = 2,
c = 1 and γ = 0.3. The range for λ is chosen so that all parametric restrictions are satisfied.
49More specifically, when n ≥ 3, λ ≥ λ˜ directly implies a larger surplus only when the IIA property holds.
50We obtain similar results with the Salop model (see the previous version of the paper).
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4 Summary, and some policy implications
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing profitability, will also result in higher in-
vestments and surplus. To deal with this claim, we have studied a model with simultaneous
cost-reducing investments and price choices and found that - absent efficiency gains in invest-
ments - the merger is anti-competitive: it lowers both investment and consumer surplus. We
have also showed that the same results arise in several classes of models where firms invest to
enhance the quality of their products, rather than to reduce their costs.
In the light of these results, we find no support for the view that a merger - by relaxing
competition - might increase incentives to invest. Rather, we have showed that, absent cost
savings from the merger, both in the general model and in all the (standard) parametric mod-
els analyzed, the merging firms will always reduce their investments. Furthermore, we have
established sufficient conditions for the merger to reduce aggregate investments.
Therefore, absent efficiency gains, the well-known detrimental effects of the merger are
confirmed in an environment where firms set not only prices but also investments. This does
not mean, of course, that a merger will always be anti-competitive in practice. Indeed, it
is possible that by combining their assets two firms will be able to reduce the costs of their
investment: if these efficiency gains were large enough, they might increase investments so much
as to outweigh the usual detrimental effect of the merger on prices.
However, a remark is in order. We have showed that to the extent that the same efficiency
gains can be achieved by a Network-Sharing Agreement (or, if we were talking about innovations
rather than investments, by a R&D cooperative agreement), such an agreement is likely to
be superior to the merger from the welfare point of view. This implies that the merging
parties should prove not only that the merger will lead to dynamic efficiencies, but also that
such efficiencies are merger-specific (that is, they cannot be reached by a less anti-competitive
agreement).
One could think of environments where mergers may lead to higher investments even absent
efficiency gains, due to the fact that higher profits may relax financial constraints. It would
be straightforward to write a model where insufficient profits would limit access to external
funding, and consolidation would bring higher earnings that the merged entity could use to
finance valuable projects that otherwise would not carry out. However, this positive effect
would in general be in conflict with the mechanisms highlighted in this paper, and an analysis
of the ensuing trade-off between ability and incentive to invest would be interesting and not
obvious. Note also that for this beneficial effect to hold it must be that - absent the merger - the
firms are unable to carry out valuable investments because financially constrained, something
that they would need to substantiate with evidence.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Omitting functional notation for qi and qk, the FOC with respect to pi
is given by:51
∂pipii,k = (pi − c(χ(qi)))∂piqi + qi −
dc(χ(qi))
dpi
qi − dF (χ(qi))
dpi
+ (pk − c(χ(qk)))∂piqk −
dc(χ(qk))
dpi
qk − dF (χ(qk))
dpi
= 0
= (pi − c(χ(qi)))∂piqi + qi + (pk − c(χ(qk)))∂piqk = 0. (A-1)
The second equality follows from (11), (12) and q = −F ′/c′, with q = {qi, qk}. After imposing
symmetry, pi = pk = p
m, we find that the equilibrium price set by the new entity is implicitly
defined by
pm = c(χ(qmi ))−
qmi
∂piq
m
i + ∂piq
m
k
> c(χ(qmi )), (A-2)
where qmi ≡ qi(pm, pm). Existence and unicity of pm are guaranteed by (A0). That pm > c(·)
is a consequence of ∂piq
m
i + ∂piq
m
k > 0, which holds by symmetry and the assumption that own
price effects are larger than cross price effects.
To show that the price level rises with the merger, pm > pb, we evaluate (A-1) at pi = p
b.
Let qbi ≡ qi(pb, pb), by (8), we have
(pb − c(χ(qbi )))∂piqbi + qbi = 0,
so the first two terms in (A-1) equal zero, but the remaining term (pb− c(χ(qbk)))∂piqbk > 0 since
∂piq
b
k > 0. As a result, ∂pipii,k > 0 at pi = pk = p
b and the prices after the merger must increase
to a price pm above pb in order to maximize profits. But since prices increase, the quantity of
each brand sold by the merged entity must fall, qmi < q
b
i . All this yields also a fall in equilibrium
investments in (11) and (12), because χ′ ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. First, we show that a similar transformation to the one operated in Lemma
1 applies to the merger problem in the presence of efficiency gains.
The investment FOC of firm i can be rewritten as:
∂xi p˜ii,k = −c′(xi)qi(pi, pk) = F ′(xi)− λ∂xiG(xi, xk)
⇐⇒ −F
′(xi)− λ∂xiG(xi, xk)
c′(xi)
= qi(pi, pk). (A-3)
At the symmetric equilibrium, xi = xk = x. Then,
−F
′(x)− λ∂xiG(x, x)
c′(x)
= qi(pi, pk).
Let − (F ′(x)− λ∂xiG(x, x)) /c′(x) ≡ φ(x|λ). Since F ′(·) − λ∂xiG(·, ·) ≥ 0, c′(·) < 0, F ′′(·) −
λ∂2xixiG(·, ·) ≥ 0 and c′′(·) ≥ 0, it follows that ∂xφ(·|λ) ≥ 0.52 Hence, φ(·|λ) is invertible and
x = φ−1(qi(pi, pk)|λ) ≡ χ(qi(pi, pk)|λ), (A-4)
51The FOC with respect to pk is analogous, thus omitted.
52The calculations are analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 1.
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with ∂qχ(·|λ) ≥ 0. Moreover, since ∂λφ(·|λ) = ∂xiG(x, x)/c′(x) < 0, then an increase in λ raises
xi, i.e., ∂λχ(·|λ) > 0.
Therefore, we can rewrite the merging firms’ maximization problem as function of pi and
pk only, in the presence of efficiency gains:
max
pi,pk
pii,k = (pi − c(χ(qi(pi, pk)|λ)))qi(pi, pk) + (pk − c(χ(qk(pi, pk)|λ)))qi(pi, pk)
−F (χ(qi(pi, pk)|λ))− F (χ(qk(pk, pi)|λ)) + λG(χ(qi(pi, pk)|λ), χ(qk(pk, pi)|λ)).
Omitting functional notation for qi and qk, the FOC with respect to pi is
∂pipii,k = (pi − c(χ(qi|λ)))∂piqi + qi + (pk − c(χ(qk|λ)))∂piqk
−dc(χ(qi|λ))
dpi
qi − dF (χ(qi|λ))
dpi
−dc(χ(qk|λ))
dpi
qk − dF (χ(qk|λ))
dpi
+λ
dG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))
dpi
= 0. (A-5)
The analysis above implies that
dc(χ(qi|λ))
dpi
= c′(χ(qi|λ))∂qiχ(qi|λ)∂piqi,
dc(χ(qk|λ))
dpi
= c′(χ(qk|λ))∂qkχ(qk|λ)∂piqk
dF (χ(qi|λ))
dpi
= F ′(χ(qi|λ))∂qiχ(qi|λ)∂piqi,
dF (χ(qk|λ))
dpi
= F ′(χ(qk|λ))∂qkχ(qk|λ)∂piqk
and
dG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))
dpi
= ∂χG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))∂qiχ(qi|λ)∂piqi
+∂χG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))∂qkχ(qk|λ)∂piqk.
Then, by the envelope theorem,
dc(χ(qi|λ))
dpi
qi +
dF (χ(qi|λ))
dpi
+
dc(χ(qk|λ))
dpi
qk +
dF (χ(qk|λ))
dpi
+ λ
dG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))
dpi
= 0.
As a consequence, the FOC in (A-5) reduces to
(pi − c(χ(qi|λ)))∂piqi + qi + (pk − c(χ(qk|λ)))∂piqk = 0.
Under our assumptions, this FOC is sufficient for optimality; thus, in the unique symmetric
equilibrium the merging firm sets
pm(λ) = c(χ(qmi |λ))−
qmi
∂piq
m
i + ∂piq
m
k
, xm(λ) = χ(qmi |λ). (A-6)
Next, suppose there is a higher level of efficiency gains, λ′ > λ. Since ∂λc(χ(qmi |λ)) = c′∂λχ ≤ 0
and ∂λχ ≥ 0, it follows by the implicit function theorem that pm(λ′) < pm(λ) and xm(λ′) >
xm(λ). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 4. If pm(λb) = pm and xm(λb) = xb denote the price and investment levels
which solve the merged entity’s problem when λ = λb, the merging firm FOC with respect to
investments in (A-3) can be written as:
∂xipii,k = −∂xic(xb)qi(pm, pm)− ∂xiF (xb) + λ∂xiG(xb, xb) = 0.
We also know that (pb, xb) solve the FOC in the benchmark with n = 2 (3). Hence, it must
be true that:
∂xipii = −∂xic(xb)qi(pb, pb)− ∂xiF (xb) = 0.
The last two equations imply:
∂xiF (x
b)− λ∂xiG(xb, xb)
qi(pm, pm)
=
∂xiF (x
b)
qi(pb, pb)
. (A-7)
Since ∂xiF (x
b) − λ∂xiG(xb, xb) < ∂xiF (xb), for the above equality to hold it must be
qi(p
m, pm) < qi(p
b, pb). In turn, this is consistent only with pm > pb. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. Writing (17) as
dpii(A−i + ri(A−i), ri(A−i))
dai
= 0,
and taking its total derivative, yields
dri(A−i)
dA−i
≡ r′i(A−i) = −
∂aiA−ipii(A−i + ai, ai)
∂aiaipii(A−i + ai, ai)
.
The denominator of this expression is negative by Assumption (A2 ) while Assumption (A3 )
implies that the ratio is strictly larger than −1. The monotonicity of A−i+ri(A−i) immediately
follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6. The total derivative of r˜i results from the observation that, since r˜i(A) ≡
ri(fi(A)),
dr˜i(A)
dA
=
dri(A−i)
dA−i
dfi(A)
dA
= r′(A−i)
dfi(A)
dA
.
Moreover, since A−i = fi(A) and A−i + ri(A−i) = A, applying the implicit function theorem to
A−i = fi(A−i + ri(A−i)) yields dfi(A)/dA = 1/(1 + r′i). Hence,
dr˜i(A)
dA
= r˜′i =
r′i
1 + r′i
,
with r˜i ∈ (0, 1) for all r′i > 0 (as it holds true with strategic complementarity). Instead, with
strategic substitutability, r′i ∈ (−1, 0) implies that r˜′i < 0 for all the values of A in which ri
takes positive values (i.e., for all A < A−i). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 7. By the definition of A−i, we have that r˜i(A) = 0 for all A ≥ A−i. Hence,
p¯ii(A) = 0 in this interval of values of A. For A < A−i,
dp¯ii(A)
dA
=
dp¯ii(A, r˜i(A))
dA
= ∂Apii(A, r˜i(A)) + ∂aipii(A, r˜i(A))
dr˜i(A)
dA
.
From (17),
∂Apii(A, ai) = −∂aipii(A, ai)
implies that
∂Apii(A, r˜i(A)) + ∂aipii(A, r˜i(A))
dr˜i(A)
dA
= ∂Apii(A, r˜i(A))
(
1− dr˜i(A)
dA
)
. (A-8)
Finally, (A1 ) together with Lemma 6 imply that (A-8) is negative, as (A1 ) implies that pii falls
with A for given ai. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 8. For the existence of the fixed point, we check that the intermediate value
theorem assumptions are satisfied. Denote by A the interval of values of A:
1. The continuity of each r˜i, i = 1, ..., n, implies that also their sum is continuous.
2. Since individual strategies spaces are compact, also A must be compact.
3.
∑n
i=1 r˜i(A) takes values in A.
Thus, it always exists a fixed point of the problem in (18).
For the uniqueness, a sufficient condition requires that
∑n
i=1 r˜
′
i(A) < 1, as in (19). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 9. By (A1 ), pik(A, ak) falls in A and the third term in (21) is negative. It
follows that r˜mi (A) < r˜i(A) for any value of ak. Similarly, r˜
m
k (A) < r˜k(A) for all ai.
53 Thus,
R˜m(A) < r˜i(A) + r˜k(A). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. First, due to firms’ symmetry, we can define by qb the equilibrium
quantity set by the firms in the benchmark, and by qmI and q
m
O the equilibrium quantities set by
the insiders (I) and outsiders (O) with the merger, respectively. Given the results in Lemma
9, the goal is to show the conditions under which nχ(qb) ≥ 2χ(qmI ) + (n− 2)χ(qmO ).
If the industry quantity is proportional to the aggregate A, then nqb ≥ 2qmI + (n − 2)qmO .
While, by Lemma 9, it is clear that qmI < q
b,54 two cases must be considered with respect to
the change in the quantity of the outsiders:
1. If qmO < qb, then χ
′ ≥ 0 implies that total and each firm’s investment fall with the merger.
2. If qb ≤ qmO , then insiders’ investment falls while outsiders’ increases. In this case, a
sufficient condition for total investments to decrease is that χ′′(·) ≤ 0. To prove this
statement, we first denote q¯ ≡ 2qmI /n + (n − 2)qmO /n. Then, Jensen’s inequality implies
that
χ(q¯) ≥ n− 2
n
χ(qmI ) +
2
n
χ(qmO ).
53Due to products’ symmetry, both insiders must be active after the merger takes place.
54The fall in ai and ak means that the price of the merging parties rises with the merger.
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If qb = q¯ and χ
′′ < 0, the result immediately follows. It follows a fortiori if qb > q¯, as, in
this case, χ′(·) ≥ 0 implies that χ(qb) > χ(q¯).
Finally, since Jensen’s inequality holds only for concave functions, we need to prove that
χ′′(·) ≤ 0 under our assumptions. By the properties of inverse functions, χ′′ ≤ 0 if and
only if φ′′ ≥ 0, or
φ′′(xi) =
∂2
∂x2i
(
−F
′(xi)
c′(xi)
)
≥ 0. (A-9)
Taking the derivative in (A-9), and omitting functional notation, we find that
sign{φ′′} = sign{−{(F ′′′c′ − c′′′F ′)(c′)2 − 2c′c′′(F ′′c′ − c′′F ′)}} .
Thus, φ′′(·) ≥ 0 under our restrictions on the functional forms of c(·) and F (·) (specifically,
these assumptions require that c′ < 0, c′′ ≥ 0, c′′′ ≥ 0, F ′ ≥ 0, F ′′ ≥ 0 and F ′′′ ≥ 0).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 10. The proof works in two steps. (1) We show that dri(A|λ)/dλ > 0 if and
only if d2pii(A, ai|λ)/(daidλ) > 0. (2) We show that, under our assumptions, dri(A|λ)/dλ > 0.
1. As observed in Lemma 6, r˜i(A|λ) = ri(f(A|λ)|λ), with A−i = fi(A) and A−i+ri(A−i|λ) =
A. Consequently,
dr˜i(A|λ)
dλ
=
dri(A−i|λ)
dA−i
df(A|λ)
dλ
+
dri(A−i|λ)
dλ
.
By the implicit function theorem, df(A|λ)/dλ = −∂λri/(1 + ∂A−iri); thus,
dr˜i(A|λ)
dλ
=
∂λri
1 + ∂A−iri
. (A-10)
The denominator of (A-10) is positive by Lemma 5, then the expression is positive if and
only if d2pii(A, ai|λ)/(daidλ) > 0, as sign{∂λri} = sign{d2(pii(A, ai|λ)+pik(A, ak|λ))/(daidλ)}.
2. We now prove that, in our aggregative formulation of the game, it holds that d2(pii(A, ai|λ)+
pik(A, ak|λ))/(daidλ) > 0. First take the derivative of pii(A, ai|λ) + pik(A, ak|λ) with re-
spect to ai. Using the envelope theorem (note that qi = qi(A, ai), but in what follows we
omit the functional notation), this expression can be written as
(ψ−1)′qi +
(
ψ−1 − c(χ(qi|λ))
) dqi
dai
+
(
ψ−1 − c(χ(qk|λ))
)
∂aiqk.
In turn, the derivative of the last expression with respect to λ yields
−c′(χ(qi|λ))∂λχ(qi|λ)dqi
dai
− c′(χ(qk|λ))∂λχ(qk|λ)∂aiqk.
Using symmetry, qi = qk, and the assumption that own action effects are larger than cross
action effects, dqi/dai + ∂aiqk > 0, we obtain that
−c′(χ(qi|λ))∂λχ(qi|λ)
(
dqi
dai
+ ∂aiqk
)
> 0.
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Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 11. First note that Ab is independent of λ. Then, by Lemma 10, the FOC
with respect to ai is strictly increasing in λ. Finally, invoking the intermediate value theorem
as in the proof of Lemma 8 yields the unicity of λ˜. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof develops in two parts, the first with n = 2 and the second
with n ≥ 3.
Let n = 2. After dropping the functional notation for qi, the FOC of (39) with respect to
pi is
(pi − c(χ(qi|λ)))∂piqi + qi +
λ
2
dG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))
dpi
−(c′(χ(qi|λ))qi + F ′(χ(qi|λ)))χ′(qi|λ)∂piqi = 0, (A-11)
where
dG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))
dpi
= ∂χG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))∂qiχ(qi|λ)∂piqi
+∂χG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))∂qkχ(qk|λ)∂piqk.
To compare the value of pb with the price set by a firm in the NSA, we evaluate the LHS of
(A-11) at p = pb and xi = χ(q
b). The resulting expression is
(pi − c(χ(qb)))∂piqb + qb +
λ
2
dG(χ(qb), χ(qb))
dpi
− (c′(χ(qb))qb + F ′(χ(qb)))χ′(qb)∂piqb
=
λ
2
dG(χ(qb), χ(qb))
dpi
≤ 0 ∀λ ≥ 0,
where the equality holds by the envelope theorem, and the final inequality follows from
dG(χ(qb), χ(qb))
dpi
= ∂χG(χ(q
b|λ), χ(qb|λ))∂qiχ(qb|λ)
(
∂piq
b + ∂pkq
b
)
< 0,
which holds true in a symmetric equilibrium by the property that own price effects dominate
cross price effects.
This shows that the price of a firm in the NSA is lower than in the benchmark. Since, by
symmetry, this is true for both firms, the final quantities produced under the NSA are larger,
and so are the values of firms’ investments.
Let n ≥ 3. We then resort to the aggregative formulation of the game. After dropping the
functional notation for qi, the maximization problem of a NSA insider is
max
ai
(ψ−1(ai)− c(χ(qi|λ)))qi − F (χ(qi|λ)) + λ
2
G(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ)).
The ensuing FOC with respect to ai is
(ψ−1)′(ai)qi + (ψ−1(ai)− c(χ(qi|λ)))dqi
dai
− (c′(χ(qi|λ))qi + F ′(χ(qi|λ)))χ′(qi|λ)dqi
dai
+
λ
2
dG(χ(qi|λ), χ(qk|λ))
dai
= 0.(A-12)
41
Evaluating (A-12) at abi , and invoking symmetry, yields
λ
2
dG(χ(qb|λ), χ(qb|λ))
dai
=
λ
2
(
dqi
dai
+
dqk
dai
)
∂χG(χ(q
b|λ), χ(qb|λ))χ′(qb|λ) ≥ 0 (A-13)
for all λ ≥ 0, where qb is the quantity of an insider firm at ab and Ab.55 Hence, NSA insiders will
have an incentive to increase ai relative to the benchmark equilibrium, which will also result in
an increase in the aggregate A. Q.E.D.
55The FOC in the benchmark under the aggregative formulation is given by
(ψ−1)′(ai)qi + (ψ−1(ai)− c(χ(qi|λ))) dqi
dai
= 0.
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